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ABSTRACT

This special section of Law and Humanities focuses on the 45th anniversary
edition of James Boyd White’s The Legal Imagination: a book that was groundbreaking when it ﬁrst appeared in 1973 (since it is generally credited as
having initiated the ‘law and literature’ movement) and that remains a hugely
important resource today. White’s approach to legal scholarship and
education - reading law’s instruments, its rhetoric and concepts alongside,
above, below and in-between literary works and criticism - opened up a new
world of intellectual possibilities. Realization of these possibilities has come in
the form of the growth and ﬂourishing, not only of law and literature but also
numerous other intersections of law and the humanities that owe a debt to
White. This symposium brings together seven eminent scholars (and readers
of The Legal Imagination) to reﬂect on the contribution that White’s book
made and continues to make to law and humanities education and
scholarship. In the order that their essays appear, the authors for this
symposium are Elizabeth Mertz, Robert P. Burns, Matthew Anderson, Jack L.
Sammons, Thomas D. Eisele, Linda L. Berger and Linda Ross Meyer.
KEYWORDS James Boyd White; The Legal Imagination; law and literature; law and humanities; 45th

anniversary edition; Wolters Kluwer

Introduction
This special section of Law and Humanities focuses on the 45th anniversary
edition of James Boyd White’s The Legal Imagination: a book that was
ground-breaking when it ﬁrst appeared in 1973 (since it is generally credited
as having initiated the ‘law and literature’ movement) and that remains a
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hugely important resource today.1 White’s approach to legal scholarship and
education – reading law’s instruments, its rhetoric and concepts alongside,
above, below and in-between literary works and criticism – opened up a
new world of intellectual possibilities. Realization of these possibilities has
come in the form of the growth and ﬂourishing, not only of law and literature
but also numerous other intersections of law and the humanities that owe a
debt to White. This symposium brings together seven eminent scholars (and
readers of The Legal Imagination) to reﬂect on the contribution that White’s
book made and continues to make to law and humanities education and
scholarship.
Readers may of course not always agree with the particular associations
that White makes, and the speciﬁc lessons he invites us to learn, from the
legal and literary sources that he brings into conversation. We may also
debate the extent to which subsequent developments in law and humanities
have advanced relevant debates to new positions. But to understand the real
and lasting signiﬁcance of The Legal Imagination it is necessary to appreciate
the wider and more general lessons in White’s writing. At this level, it is clear
that the work is not merely an argument or a method. It is, rather, a much
deeper re-imagining of legal education, scholarship and practice, and one
that seeks to make good a deﬁcit in these practises by eﬀecting a reconnection between them and some basic values and principles. White’s broad and
inclusive approach to thinking about what makes for a persuasive argument,
for good writing and wise judgment – in circumstances of apparently intractable dispute and using language that is inherently given to ambiguity and
indeterminacy – continues to stand as an important critique of law’s traditional reliance on objectivizing logics, instrumental reasoning and technical
knowledge.
The imaginative opening up of and restoring integrity to legal scholarship
and education that White advocates and that law and literature approaches
have since sought to advance, furthermore engages professional and personal questions about the place of humanity itself within the law. It may be
tempting to caricature this as an audacious claim on behalf of law and literature to ‘complete’ a legal profession that would otherwise be all unforgiving
sharp edges (think of the Dickensian lawyers Tulkinghorn (Bleak House) and
Jaggers (Great Expectations)). However there is no denying the sense of revitalization and renewal upon encountering the writings of James Boyd White
that comes through in the contributions below. All of the contributors to this
symposium are scholars whose own work has in one way or another been
impacted or inﬂuenced by this encounter.
1

James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination: 45th Anniversary Edition (Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands:
Wolters Kluwer 2018). The Legal Imagination was ﬁrst published by Little Brown in 1973. There have
been subsequent abridged editions, but 2018 is the ﬁrst time it has been republished in its entirety
since then, and includes a new Foreword by the author.
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The contributions to this collection are organized into two broad
sections. The ﬁrst of these sections comprises four essays that address
White’s book at the level of its broad ethos and its signiﬁcance as an education
workbook. The second section comprises a further three essays that discuss
some more particular aspects of White’s approach to reading and teaching
law, and the ways in which White engages speciﬁc legal instruments,
notions and concepts.
We begin then with Elizabeth Mertz’s essay ‘Reading, writing, speaking, and
teaching law: James Boyd White and legal integrity’ in which she considers how
The Legal Imagination oﬀers a critique of an instrumentality that can pervade
the reading and ‘speaking’ of law, and White’s promotion of integrity in legal
education by way of combining technical legal skills with a ‘sense of ethics
and humanity’. Then in ‘A path to self-awareness’, Robert P. Burns characterizes
White’s approach as being aimed at drawing students away from idealizing
objectivity and towards appreciation of the ambiguity and ﬂuidity in legal
language. Matthew Anderson’s essay ‘A book of questions’ follows on from
this, focusing on the role of law and literature in education – both intended
and unintended – and on the use of metaphor and irony in developing techniques in would-be lawyers of ‘good writing’. Jack Sammons’s essay completes
this ﬁrst section, and he oﬀers some reﬂections on human rights and the
problem of indeterminacy in their application. Sammons compares the role
of the judge to that of the poet, and the problems associated with ﬁnding
meaning in text – the two roles converging in the primacy of the imagination.
The second section begins with Thomas D. Eisele’s essay ‘Law as a Literature’, in which Eisele suggests that White’s treatment of law as a form of literature means seeing legal texts and literary ones as similarly ‘wording the world’,
and ‘sketching ways to behave’ in various contexts. Eisele reviews how White
invites students to see law in this way and seeks to convince them to understand law’s various forms – wills, statutes, judicial opinions, etc. – as comprising ways of speaking meaningfully about important aspects of our social
existence. Then Linda L. Berger in her ‘The metaphor of the opinion as a
poem’ takes White’s suggestion that we read judgments as poems (i.e. in
terms of their potential to generate new meanings from the apparently familiar) and applies it to particular legal cases. She uses this method to appreciate
opinions as humane acts of imagination and understanding. The ﬁnal essay of
this section and for the symposium as a whole is Linda Ross Meyer’s ‘Charitable interpretation: lessons from The Legal Imagination’. Meyer addresses
White’s invitation to readers to consider what sort of ‘conversation’ a
statute is inviting its readers to have about justice, fairness, rights, harms,
and so forth. Exhorting readers to consider the humanity that comes into
contact with the statute (rather than simply the latter’s ‘original’ or ‘textual’
meaning), Meyer considers the implications of White’s insistence that
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reading a statute humanely means attending to the ‘conversation’ that it
implicitly sets up as between executive, legislature and judiciary.
‘Conversation’ is also an apt expression for the evolution of scholarly tradition, involving as it does multiple and various voices and interactions. The
conversation that James Boyd White initiated, which has been joined and contributed to by so many others and that continues to shape itself in numerous
directions is surely testament to enduring relevance of The Legal Imagination.
The contributions to this symposium oﬀer a timely reminder of this, but also,
we hope, may spark new threads of conversation.
David Gurnham, March 2019

Elizabeth Mertz, ‘reading, writing, speaking, and teaching law:
James Boyd White and legal integrity’
The original volume entitled The Legal Imagination is a coursebook – a book
meant to be used in teaching. As is the custom in such volumes, the main
readings are excerpts from other texts. Of course, the selection of those
excerpts tells us a lot about the author. The Legal Imagination draws on
excerpts all the way from statutes and legal cases to poetry and sociology. Students in this course will encounter Charles S. Johnson, sociologist and president of Fisk University, writing on ‘Growing Up in the Black Belt’, side-byside with the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. They will try to
imagine what light Jane Austen can shed on the sentencing of juveniles in
the United States. The selected readings will ask them to roam from ancient
Greece to Osawatomie, Kansas – from France during the Terror to Levittown.
But the most direct examples of the author’s voice in this kind of book can
be found in the comments and questions and writing assignments connecting the excerpted readings. Here is part of the ﬁnal writing assignment in
the book, a passage in which James Boyd White addresses his student readers:
As you can tell, I have drawn heavily on my own experience of literature and literary criticism in deﬁning a point of view from which to regard the law. One
might even say that this course is an attempt to connect diﬀerent sides of my
own intellectual life, a response to a feeling that the life of the lawyer is
somehow set oﬀ from all other experience. In drawing the connection, one
deﬁnes a context: the legal life can be understood by being compared. ‘How
does the lawyer think and write?’ can be understood by comparing him with
others. And of course the reader of literature is used to asking exactly the sort
of questions about the use of language that I, for one, have found most illuminating in application to the law.2

This passage calls us – along with White’s students – to a profound quest. It
does not shy away from the personal, but it speaks of our personal
2

James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination (Little, Brown & Co 1973) 967.
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connections as part of a deep intellectual and ethical puzzle: can we adopt our
professional languages while still remaining ourselves? Can those of us who
trained as lawyers be true to that calling without giving up too much of our
humanity? James Boyd White’s work over a lifetime in law and literature
has never stopped challenging the limits of this question, whether he is
writing of life as a lawyer, literary critic, reader, writer – or perhaps most passionately, as a teacher. I am honoured to be part of this celebration of White’s
legacy. I write out of gratitude, both personal and professional, for what he
has encouraged me and others to dare in our own work.

Intellectual integration as a calling
Like many others, I have beneﬁtted from White’s generosity of spirit. After
completing my PhD in Anthropology, I held a postdoctoral fellowship at the
Center for Psychosocial Studies in Chicago; as part of that experience I was
asked to help organize a working group on ‘Language and Law’ that met at
the University of Chicago. For a young scholar, that working group was an
exciting but potentially intimidating gathering, composed largely of wellknown ﬁgures such as Wayne Booth, Michael Silverstein, Milton Singer,
John Comaroﬀ, Edward Levi, Cass Sunstein, James Boyd White, and other
Chicago faculty – as well as colleagues from the Center like Bernard Weissbourd and Benjamin Lee. For a young woman – and usually the only
woman in the room – the setting could be especially challenging. But
several people in the group made an eﬀort to reach out to me, the least
‘important’ person there in socially conventional terms – and one was
White.3 After a presentation I gave, he made a point of coming up to me to
oﬀer searching but encouraging comments. And then he startled me by
asking something to the eﬀect of: ‘You are going to go on to a faculty position
after this, aren’t you?’ (The question presupposed that I would have that
choice, a matter about which I was far from certain then, needless to say!)
Over the time we were both in that Working Group, White repeated this
pointed question several times, conveying a sense of respect as well as a
belief in my potential that meant a great deal. And simultaneously, I had
the good fortune of beginning a conversation with White’s work that continues to this day.
As I delved more deeply into the intersection of language and law in my
own work, I became convinced that I needed to receive training in the
language of law – much as any anthropologist would need to train in a

3

In conventional terms, I was very junior, female, and an outsider to the University of Chicago community,
in contrast to everyone else there. (I should add that another member of that seminar, Michael Silverstein, conveyed support and over subsequent years was an unfailingly generous colleague – as he has
been to so many others.)
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ﬁeld language.4 I attended law school and wound up working on the law
review, overseeing the process by which student editors selected articles
for publication. Among the pieces we published that year was one by
White called ‘Intellectual Integration’ – which went on to become the ﬁrst
chapter of his pathbreaking book, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural
and Legal Criticism (1990). ‘Intellectual Integration’ contains a very honest
description of professorial malaise, posed appropriately in terms of reading
and writing and language:
Imagine … that you are a professor in your oﬃce, littered with books and journal
articles. With what hopes and expectations do you imagine that you turn to
them? If you are at all like me you do so not with eager anticipation but with
a feeling of guilty dread and with an expectation of frustration. For we live in
a world of specialized texts and discourse, marked by a kind of thinness, a
want of life and force and meaning. All too often we simply skim-read a text,
and all too often we do so with a sense that nothing is lost.5

What a relief to hear this diagnosis! This arrestingly realistic portrait of what is
supposed to be a life happily spent in deep scholarly musings became more
and more relevant to me as I advanced into a career alluringly located in the
busy intersection occupied by interdisciplinary legal studies.6 I frequently
went back to White’s lament, his worry that today’s academic discourse is
too thin and dead and bleached:
We read more widely than our citations reﬂect; we think more variously than our
arguments suggest; … and our relations with prior texts are more rich and interesting than our bibliographic notes, in their misleading claims to represent what
we have read and thought about, are likely to suggest. (Suppose our references
were not to the literature we think we are supposed to have read but to the texts
we actually have read, and thought about, and wish to respond to: How diﬀerent
would our writing be, in voice and sense of audience, in shape and tone?)7

White ends this section of the chapter asking what it would mean to integrate,
to put back together, the thoughts and meanings that we segment off when
we speak in professional voices. I have carried that question with me for
decades, and I suspect I’m not alone.
4

The decision was encouraged indirectly by my legally trained co-author, Barney Weissbourd, who told me
emphatically that I would not be arguing with him about his interpretation of HLA Hart’s work had I
attended law school! (I never did yield on my interpretation of Hart but was deeply grateful to him
for pushing me in that way.) The decision also reﬂected a practical eye on the future as half of an academic couple both of whom needed extra ﬂexibility on the job market.
5
James Boyd White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism (University of Chicago
Press 1990) 8.
6
White points out the limitations and promise of legal ways of approaching interdisciplinary work (ibid 12–
20, 46–86). Roughly speaking, he views law as less imperialist than economics, less likely to presume it
can translate everything. But he also identiﬁes serious problems with lawyers’ attempts to simply pick up
the ‘ﬁndings’ or ‘methods’ of other ﬁelds. I would add that interdisciplinary research expands the volume
and scope of readings and knowledge that we expect ourselves to cover, which is itself a temptation to
shallower readings (and frequent despair).
7
White (n 5) 11.
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Learning legal language
Justice as Translation opens by quoting Wittgenstein, in a passage that echoes
a recurring theme found throughout White’s writings: ‘To imagine a language
means to imagine a form of life’.8 In The Legal Imagination, White urges law
students to imagine the form of life they will inhabit as lawyers – as professionals who use the language of law. What, he asks, are ‘the unexpressed
assumptions or characteristics of legal discourse’; what are ‘the special characteristics of the writer who is a lawyer’; and how might these change depending on whether the lawyer is ‘speaking as counselor, advocate, legislator [or]
judge’?9 The ﬁrst section of The Legal Imagination is devoted to the lawyer as
writer, and the very beginning of that section focuses on ‘learning the
language of law’. The process of learning a language, White suggests, oﬀers
us a prism through which to view its unexpressed assumptions and special
characteristics. What happens when Mark Twain learns to view the Mississippi
River through his training as a boat pilot, by contrast with Dickens’s view of
the same river as a doting tourist – or with LaSalle’s unselfconscious description of the Mississippi River basin as part of land he claims for King Louis the
Fourteenth of France? Using the professional language of the pilot or the
imperialist language of the colonizer changes what we can see, how
we can understand, even as we use language to describe the ‘same’ thing.
And law school is where lawyers begin their own shift to a speciﬁcally legal
‘form of life’.
As White clearly knew, a close examination of what happens in schooling
had also informed generations of social science and linguistic researchers
studying education. Inspired by those researchers as well as by White’s
version of law-and-literature and my own beloved ﬁeld of anthropology, I
myself undertook an intensive linguistic study of law school training.10
Using ‘the somewhat clunky and less than elegant language’ and methods
of social science, I worked with a research team to analyse tapes, observational notes, and transcripts from ﬁrst-semester Contracts classes taught at
eight diﬀerent law schools.11
While the professors we studied used a variety of styles – from largely
lecture to almost conversational – we were able to track shared linguistic features of the language in all of the classrooms. Those features indicated ‘a core
approach to the world and to human conﬂict that is perpetuated through
8

Ludwig Wittgenstein and GEM Anscombe, Philosophical Investigations, Part I (Blackwell 1997) §19.
White (n 5) xxxii.
10
Elizabeth Mertz, The Language of Law School: Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” (Oxford University Press
2007). The study also included interviews with professors and students taking the classes.
11
The quotation is from my review of Justice as Translation in the Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities,
where I made a case for integrating work from Critical Race Studies and Anthropology into White’s
vision of law (Elizabeth Mertz, ‘Creative Acts of Translation: James Boyd White’s Intellectual Integration’ (1992) 4 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 165, 166). I use the quote to indicate a continuing sense of awkwardness over how best to bring the rhetorics together.
9
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U.S. legal language’ – one that subtly reoriented students away from considerations of social context and morality.12 This reorientation is accomplished, not
surprisingly, through a quiet shift in habits surrounding reading and talking
about texts. Drawing on White’s work, I urge legal educators and lawyers to
‘take seriously the combined linguistic-cultural-ethical orientation that characterizes law as a ﬁeld’ – and that invisibly drains away vibrancy from a law student’s ‘form of life’.13
But even if we all take this problem seriously, what can we do about it? The
question worried famed law professor and legal realist Karl Llewellyn, writing
in The Bramble Bush, who began his book quoting this short poem:
There was a man in our town
and he was wondrous wise:
he jumped into a BRAMBLE BUSH
and scratched out both his eyes –
and when he saw that he was blind,
with all his might and main
he jumped into another one
and scratched them in again.14

Law students, Llewellyn tells us, are like this unfortunate man, and law school
is the bramble bush that, during the students’ initial training, scratches out
their eyes. They are for a time left blind:
The hardest job of the ﬁrst year is to lop oﬀ your common sense, to knock your
ethics into temporary anesthesia. Your view of social policy, your sense of justice
– to knock these out of you along with woozy thinking, along with ideas all
fuzzed along their edges. You are to acquire ability to think precisely, to analyze
coldly, to work within a body of materials that is given to see, and see only, and
manipulate, the machinery of the law. It is not easy thus to turn human beings
into lawyers. Neither is it safe. For a mere legal machine is a social danger.15

Coming from very different directions and times, so many have converged on
this important insight, familiar to any reader of White’s work as well. Llewellyn,
not unlike White, works to build a broader vision of what a lawyer should be: ‘a
mere legal machine is not even a good lawyer. It lacks insight and judgment. It
lacks the power to draw into hunching that body of intangibles that lie in
social experience’16. A good lawyer, Llewellyn urges us, must eventually
return to re-incorporate a new version of humanity. But how?17
12

Mertz (n 10) 4.
ibid 218.
14
This seems to be an English nursery rhyme; Llewellyn does not enlighten us as to his exact source.
15
Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and its Study, Steven Alan Childress (ed) compiled and
annotated by Stewart Macaulay (Quid Pro Quo Books 2012 [1930]) 106. I thank Stewart Macaulay for
connecting the dots between my own work and that of Llewellyn.
16
Llewellyn (n 15) 106.
17
At the end of my own study, I urge those trained in law to reﬂect on how they might embrace forms of
humility that are in some ways the opposite of the technical legal reading to which the ﬁrst year
13
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Scratching our eyes back in again?
In some ways, Llewellyn is presupposing that it is possible to move past the
profound separation of self from soul that he describes as part of the ﬁrst
year in legal education. His proposed remedy has surprising parallels with
White’s: he pushes his students to read law more deeply during their
second and third years of training:
The drama of society: each opinion a human document; each case a human
struggle, warm with life; each changing rule of motion of the giant whose
hands control your destiny and mine … . I say in these things there is poetry,
in these things there is life, in these things there is beauty … .
Go, then, and read – in the law and out. Work at your art, your science, your philosophy – work even at your Mencken, if you must … But bring the work home
again, and merge it with your law … .18

What strikes me as I put this text into conversation with The Legal Imagination is how much Llewellyn leaves to chance, whereas White picks out a
speciﬁc pathway. ‘Go forth and read’ could describe what either of them
told us to do at the broadest level – but read what, and how? In the end, Llewellyn is quite pessimistic that most of his students will take the general path
he prescribes.19 The pull of making a living through manipulating technical
law – the form of life that this entails – seems to Llewellyn far too enticing.
Having lost their sight in the ﬁrst year, all too few lawyers will wind up scratching their eyes back in again.
By contrast, White’s Legal Imagination asks students to keep working at this
integration throughout their education. He introduces the reading of particular statutes or cases as potentially informed by deeper visions. He asks that
students examine what they are losing and gaining at each step: how could
you bring a technical and lyrical view of a river together? This profound translation is not easily achieved; it must be fought for at every step.20 The Legal
Imagination takes us through many such steps, in their particularity. From
many angles, it pushes students to remember the voices of the subjects of
socializes incipient lawyers (Mertz (n 10) 223). This kind of humility is necessary to any form of ‘excellent
translation’ – of life into law, and back again, as White has taught us.
Llewellyn (n 15) 134–35.
19
White (n 2) 159.
20
Exploring the theme of ‘translation’ in White’s work would require another essay; like many, I was
inspired by the challenges he posed surrounding interdisciplinary translation. Years later, I joined a
group of ‘New Legal Realist’ scholars who aimed to remind legal theorists of the long and important
tradition of attention to human life and on-the-ground injustices within U.S. legal thought. This was
in part a response to a ﬂood of work that elevated the ‘rational actor’, and of course the ‘reasonable
man’ – but also metrics far removed from what social science and narrative told us was actually happening with law in our society. My own modest contribution, straight from my anthropological linguistics
background – but also my engagement with White’s work – was to stress that we need to pay much
more attention to what we lose (or gain) through particular translations into (and out of) law. Elizabeth
Mertz, William Ford, and Gregory Matoesian (eds), Translating the Social World for Law: Linguistic Tools for
a New Legal Realism (Oxford University Press 2016).
18
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law. It’s hard to imagine most law students reaching out this far without
speciﬁc guidance of the sort White provides.
In a later book, From Expectation to Experience, White would explore his
thoughts on teaching in a more explicit way, again giving us refreshingly
honest reﬂections on how real life in our profession can feel.21 Here he
traces the track of a semester in the classroom, from initial high expectations
through the inevitable disappointments, and moves on to talk speciﬁcally
about his experience in teaching The Legal Imagination. He stresses repeatedly
that this course is not simply about ‘law and literature’, but rather deals with
‘the activity of a mind that is trying to come to terms with the various
languages it is given to use, trying to judge, modify, and control them by
an art that is at once intellectual and ethical’.22 As is usual with White’s
writing, these chapters inspire and unsettle, prompting us to re-think what
we are teaching when we teach ‘legal writing’ or how to ‘read law’. But we
have to return to The Legal Imagination to ﬁnd a step-by-step map of what
White envisions as an alternative pedagogy, because generalizations leave
too much of the path unspeciﬁed.
In re-tracing many of the steps of this path as I looked back over the book, it
struck me that we need not stick to all of the particular readings or byways
that White selected to continue learning from his method, his vision here.
Where White turns to ask how the law talks about people – how racial
language, for example, works in and through law – we now have generations
of scholarship by critical race and intersectional scholars on law. For example,
we could read law professor Patricia Williams, writing of legal education but
also of law more deeply imagined, digging more deeply into the interpretive
world inhabited by ‘rights’ for those at the margins.23 The possibilities abound;
the urgency of these juxtapositions as integral parts of lawyers’ training
perhaps never more evident than today.24

21

James Boyd White, From Expectation to Experience: Essays on Law and Legal Education (University of
Michigan Press 1999)
22
ibid 76.
23
Patricia Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Mad Law Professor (Harvard University Press
1991)146–65.
24
The scope of this essay doesn’t leave me room to even sketch most of the possibilities, or of the ground
already travelled in eﬀorts to address the perennial problem of ﬁnding a systematic way of restoring law
students’ sight after the ﬁrst year. The Carnegie Report on U.S. legal education (William Sullivan, Anne
Colby, Judith Welch Wegner, Lloyd Bond, and Lee Shulman, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law (Jossey-Bass 2007)) remarked on how little progress we’ve made in this regard since Llewellyn’s time; there are entire literatures now on law student well-being, on the perverse incentives in
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points us to many ways we could do that.
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Coda: legal integration, legal integrity
At the end of The Legal Imagination, White returns to the question of legal
education. Here much of his voice emerges through the questions he asks:
In this course you have examined the activity of the legal mind in several
ways: by comparing legal language with other forms of expression; by exploring as best you can what the lawyer does behind the language that he uses;
and by analyzing the structure and limits of legal speech and through as a
discrete intellectual system. You have come at the law from the inside and
from the outside. Having asked yourself how the ‘law’ could be deﬁned as
the subject matter of education … you are now asked to explain how it
can be taught and learned. … . Can you tell your law school and its teachers
what they should be doing?25

By this time in the book, students have seen a myriad of ways that their law
schools could be deepening their vision of law – ways to integrate what they
know of law as a technique with their sense of ethics and humanity. The intellectual integration that White paints for us is also a way of restoring integrity,
as he himself notes:
Finally let me say, as you have no doubt already guessed, that the image of integration I have been trying to get before us is an image not only of intellectual
but of social and political life as well, a way of thinking about the relations
between people and races and cultures … 26

The Legal Imagination provides us a map for this kind of integration, as it
models a form of life with integrity.

Robert P. Burns, ‘a path to self-awareness’
Approaches to legal education often depend on an implicit view of the nature
of ‘the law’ or legal practice. A vision of the law as composed mainly of rules
that resolve most problematic situations, ‘the rule of law as a law of rules’, as
Justice Scalia liked to put it, will likely emphasize the mastery of large swaths
of legal doctrine and some attention to the technical canons surrounding its
interpretation. An understanding of law as an eﬀective instrument of policy
goals that are created through legislative ﬁat will likely emphasize the social
sciences that claim to provide the most reliable theoretical underpinning
for the ‘social engineering’ in which lawyers and judges engage to achieve
those goals.27 In either case, the legal order is a bureaucracy whose agents,
lawyers and judges, are bureaucrats who resolve individual cases by applying
legal rules or social scientiﬁc laws on the social world.
25
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James Boyd White’s The Legal Imagination likewise relies on and embodies
a distinctive understanding of law and legal practice that has informed his
work from the beginning and which he has expounded over the decades.
He tells us in the Preface to the Anniversary Edition of The Legal Imagination
that the book is ‘not in form a jurisprudence book, but it is based upon, and
acts out of, a view of law itself, a view that strongly resists current inclinations
to reduce law to matters of social policy, or theory, or economics, or politics’.28
‘Law has its own materials, its own life, and its own way of being[,] … not a
structure but an activity of mind and imagination’.29 The text is self-consciously not a treatise, but a ‘workbook’ that allows the reader to become
aware of his or her own self-consciousness, a kind of self appropriation, ‘the
personally appropriated structure of one’s own experiencing, one’s own intelligent inquiry and insights, one’s own critical reﬂection and judging and
deciding’30 in the process of performing the exercises in the text. This selfunderstanding provides access to aspects of the legal world that are not
otherwise available, that can only be developed by ‘performance and implication’ because they involve a ‘whole cluster of habits of mind and expression’
involving ‘social practices and deﬁnitions, which can be learned and mastered,
modiﬁed or preserved, by the individual mind’.31
The text encourages placing this incipient mastery within the young lawyer’s
‘larger individual and intellectual life’ through the resources that great literature
and philosophy oﬀer, but, at least as importantly, through his own experience of
social and personal life, the ‘ordinary stuﬀ of life[,] … experiences of his or her
own, with the thought that they can provide an analogy or perspective from
which to examine the texts and issues before us’.32 It will turn out that this
form of self-consciousness parallels the consciousness of the lawyer and the
judge whose minds embrace the distinctive materials and techniques of the
law, but also reach for justice. In the case of the judge:
A part of [the judge’s] mind will think in terms of legal arguments of the kind we
have been discussing, testing them against each other for their force and power.
But beneath that layer of the mind is another, an intuitive center, educated by
experience and reﬂection that is really seeking the right decision. The judge
knows that her written opinions never express or justify what the center of
herself is doing, the secret spring of judgment at her core. This tension
cannot be resolved in an a priori way by a rule or principle, but must, like the
others mentioned, be lived through in detail and addressed anew every time.33

28

James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination: 45th Anniversary Edition (Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer 2018) xxii.
29
ibid.
30
Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (New York: Philosophical Library 1958) xviii.
31
White (n 28) xxii.
32
ibid xxiii.
33
James Boyd White, ‘An Old-Fashioned View of the Nature of Law’ (2011) 12 Theoretical Inquiries in Law
394.

LAW AND HUMANITIES

13

Lawyers, for their part, are not seeking ‘the single meaning of the statutes, of
the judicial opinions, of the regulations, and of other materials of authority’,
but ‘are demonstrating the range of possible meanings that these texts
may be given’.34 Because each case is unique, lawyers and judges live ‘at
the edge of languages where they can and so break down and where new formulations must be made’ through ‘invention and imagination, constrained as
art always is, by her responsibilities to her material and to her world’.35 Literature has a place in the education of a lawyer, not as providing a theory to
resolve individual cases, but because it often brings the reader ‘to the edge
of language’, and can respect ‘both a multiplicity of voices and the self that
can hear them’.36 White offers this sober account of the sensibility that
emerges from a student’s encounter with his text:
You might sum up the experience this course oﬀers by saying that it is an experience in the collapse of language under strain: the collapse not only of the legal
language, but of the other languages you have used … .You have experienced
what could be called the central frustration of writer and lawyer, the perpetual
breaking down of language in your hands as you try to use it. None of our
languages seem to be able to do what it promises, none can bear the stress
of our demands for truth and order and justice. Such, it seems to me, are the
conditions of our existence.37

It is an inescapable feature of our legal practices that our arguments are
always about both justice and law, White has told us. And so lawyers and
judges must grasp not only the ‘semantic meaning’ of a rule, but also, as Marianne Constable puts it, ‘what lies behind the rule, “the poem behind the
poem,”’ the reality that can show itself in the law’s practices.38 These ‘invocations of justice … reveal the distinctiveness of law’.39 These intuitions of
justice are beyond the ‘propositional view of language so dominant in our
legal culture’ but emerge from the tensions among legal materials and the
student’s broader intellectual and moral world, itself encompassing many perspectives. It is similar to what Hannah Arendt called ‘reﬂective judgment’,
occurring where I form a judgment ‘by considering a given issue from
diﬀerent viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of
those who are absent’ and so ‘enlarging’ my understanding’.40
A recurring theme in White’s work is that the ‘structure of thought and
expression, built on a distinct set of dynamic and dialogic tensions’ that is
the law is ‘inherently unstable’. This means that each person, lawyer or
34
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judge, who speaks in a legal context is responsible for resolving the indeterminacy in the way his imagination best allows and with integrity. Lawyers
must take care that their expressions remain ‘living’, and not lapse into the
kind of bureaucratic speech that prevails where no one is responsible –
Arendt’s ‘rule by nobody’.41 Scientists seeking explanation through disengagement and objectivization distance themselves from their subject. By contrast, lawyers should bring their whole selves to bear on the material both to
share their own moral vision and also to learn what the world can teach about
right and wrong, the ‘ethics already realized’ in institutions and practices. The
eﬀorts of lawyers can subject the legal materials and the facts to ‘the most
intense and searching scrutiny’ to reveal the ‘range of possible meanings
that these texts may be given, and using all our powers to do so’. That
eﬀort dramatizes how ‘the judge will have to make her choice and have to
accept responsibility for it – not push the decision oﬀ on a statute or other
text that is read in a conclusory or unthinking way’.42 Both the lawyer and
the judge stand in an imperfect world and any argument or judgment they
make is not likely to be fully candid. In particular,
The judge pretends that he is wise and good, and this means that he can be
taxed, and by his own standards, when he is not; how much better this is
than if he pretended simply to be the representative of a class or ideology or
psychological impulse – which would, despite its claims, be no more ‘real’, but
simply articulate a diﬀerent idealized state. It would be equally a pretense,
but not one to build one’s life on.43

This understanding of the law is strongly countercultural. As Charles Taylor
has argued, a central theme of modern culture elevates the objectivizing
stance that creates distance between the individual and what he or she
seeks to understand. The self who is the subject of the modern enterprise
‘gains control through disengagement’ which is ‘always correlative to objectivization’. ‘Objectifying a given domain involves depriving it of its normative
force’, even if that domain has previously ‘set norms or standards for us’.
‘[O]nce we come to see the world as a mechanism, domain of eﬃcient causation, but without inherent purpose, then we are free to treat it where our main
concern is to eﬀect our own purposes. Instrumental reason becomes the only
appropriate category, and knowledge can be seen as the basis of power’.44
That modern objectivizing stance lies at the basis of the bureaucratic domination through knowledge that lawyers and judges may take as their model and
that White so resolutely opposes.
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The exercises and assignments in The Legal Imagination draw students into
the legal world’s form of life. This is done ‘not by conceptual elaboration, but
by performance and implication, the only way I think it can be done’.45 They
cultivate the kind of self-awareness that arises when they must speak in their
own voice, but also engage with materials, legal or literary or philosophical,
that come to them from their culture. They experience the responsibility
that comes with the resolution they embrace. ‘In the course of the book the
student is asked to write as lawyer, judge, and legislator, and reﬂect as a
mind and a person on what he has done, to speak in his own voice about
his experience of writing and thinking’.46 The book is designed to allow the
student ‘to come to productive terms with the nature and limits of legal
language in a way that does justice to the workings of their own minds and
to the experience of those whom the law may threaten, injure or assist’.47
This comes with a distinctive educational advantage.
Law students often have a kind of ‘rage for order’ that tempts them to
elevate the kind of knowledge that is clear and objective. They are often impatient with ambiguity and indeterminacy. They wonder ‘what we have learned’
from a humanistic approach that relies on a sequence of questions that seek
to disclose an awareness that is ‘at the edge of language’. This is a perspective
that makes it virtually impossible for them to understand the legal world as it
is, at least without falling into a corrosive cynicism about that world. It has
often been said that the cynic is a disappointed idealist.
This kind of ‘workbook, full of questions’ as opposed to a ‘textbook, full of
assertions’ has a distinct advantage. The student is active and he is ‘asked
how he can contribute to this literature of the law – to this world of thought
and expression – and in so doing so, how he deﬁned his profession and
himself’.48 My own experience in teaching a speciﬁc subject, the Law of Evidence, from a workbook, not a treatise or a casebook, is that students, speaking
as lawyers in role, are actively engaged in the constitutive rhetoric that, in the
case of Evidence Law, partially makes the trial what it is.49 The indeterminacy of
the rules in the dense complexity of a particular case invites acts of imagination
and articulation in the student’s own voice. As rhetoricians have always known,
that voice must reﬂect an ethos that has the speciﬁc kind of integrity that a
public person can have. (White tells us that ‘this book may be of wider relevance
now’ because ‘its central concern is with integrity – integrity of law, or language,
of the individual person – at a time when integrity itself sometimes seems to be
threatened as a value’.50) Students come to see that the reasonableness of ‘the
45
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law’ resides in an adversarial practice that honours the ﬁrst principle of procedural justice, ‘Let the other side be heard!’51 Each argument can always be
better and the understanding that emerges from the opposing arguments is
richer for that opposition. The process has a kind of integrity and students,
now asked to take the position of the judge, see one resolution as likely to
be better, more comprehensive, than the other. This is something students
understand because they are participants in the process, they have, as White
might put it, invested some part of themselves in that process. They are
invited, in just the way White does with much more sophistication, to
achieve an understanding discontinuous with the ideal of distance and objectivity that often characterizes the modern academy.

Matthew Anderson, ‘a book of questions’
Where to begin? In the case of The Legal Imagination the question is more
than rhetorical, for the book is nothing if not a book of questions – wondrous,
wonderfully inviting, open-ended questions that inspire the student-reader to
ﬁnd her voice as a legal writer, and, through it, to create her place in the life of
the law. And, underwriting it all, White’s celebrated vision of the lawyer as
artist. Who could resist?
If space permitted I would extend the gesture of the opening and explore
what happens when we turn the self-reﬂexivity of White’s own method –
the way that he turns and directs his student-reader’s attention ﬁrst
towards texts and then towards their own writing – back towards his own
text and writing. What do we notice, what can we say about White’s
voice, his style, his language? What do these elements reveal about his
structure of feeling, about how he comes to terms with his life in the law
as a teacher and scholar? Put diﬀerently, what is the stamp of his originality,
or what originates with The Legal Imagination? It would be a fruitful
approach to his text, one that would focus on its integrity – precisely the
quality that in his ‘Foreword’ to the Anniversary Edition he identiﬁes as
the central concern of the book.52 However, I will limit myself, here, to
oﬀering a few comments of a general, at once retrospective and forwardlooking nature, about why the republication of the book is the cause for celebration and reﬂection that it is; about how it reads now, as we look back at
it forty-ﬁve years after its initial publication; and about how what White
oﬀers still speaks to us with an inspired understanding of the possibilities
of legal education and liberal education, and of Law and Literature as an
interdisciplinary movement.
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Though I have a sense of how original White’s vision of the lawyer-as-artist
was at the time of the ﬁrst publication of the book, I am not in a position to
assess how generative it has been in the ﬁeld of legal education. However, I
can oﬀer three comments about how the book reads today from the perspective of interdisciplinary studies in literature, and more broadly, a commitment
to liberal education. First, the book’s title unmistakably echoes Lionel Trilling’s
The Liberal Imagination, and behind that Mathew Arnold’s vision of the ennobling promise of a cultivated relationship with literature. This is not the place
to develop a reading of a possible, implied dialogue with Trilling’s text; it
would be a rich conversation, not least because it would bring out questions
of class and politics that are adumbrated but typically not engaged with
directly in The Legal Imagination. Trilling writes not only as literary critic, but
also as a social and cultural critic for the left in the shadow of Stalinism. He
oﬀers a diagnosis of the political consequences of what he sees as the political
shallowness and disconnection of the imagination and sensibility of the ‘educated class’53, which he ties to that class’s ‘alienation from the most impressive
literature of our time’54. In The Legal Imagination, White writes at a diﬀerent
historical moment, as a teacher invested in the education of law students at
a time when the inﬂuence of the social sciences, especially economics, in
legal education and jurisprudential thinking was increasingly hegemonic. As
he says in his ‘Introduction To The Student’, he oﬀers an invitation to
imagine law diﬀerently, as an art not a science.55
White shares Trilling’s exquisite attunement to the lineaments of literary
form and style, his sense that a closely felt and practiced connection with literature can be vital as a way to cultivate imagination and feeling in ways that
matter. Unlike Trilling, as a reader his approach to literature aligns in key
aspects with that of the New Criticism, notably in the way that he foregrounds
the tropes of irony, metaphor, and ambiguity. In The Legal Imagination,
White’s focus is on the emergence of the individual student and more on
the civic and institutional, rather than the political and societal, implications
of an engagement with literature – though in this text as in his other writings
he is ever alive to the perils that attend the individual and society alike when
the language of law becomes a deadened and deadening language of authority, rather than living, authoritative speech. The diﬀerence between the two
writers is most palpable on the level of tone. White is optimistic and forwardlooking about the possibilities that open up for the individual student as she
imagines and prepares for a life in the law; as he observes in the Preface to the
abridged edition, his voice is ‘exuberant’ and even ‘wild’56. (I detect an echo of
Emily Dickinson in his usage of the latter adjective.) The terrain of the legal
53

Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination (New York Review of Books 2008) 99.
ibid.
55
White (n 28) xliii.
56
James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination: Abridged Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1985) xvi.
54

18

E. MERTZ ET AL.

imagination isn’t that of the body politic of Henry James’s ‘imagination of disaster’57, which Trilling brilliantly anatomizes in his essay on The Princess Casamassima. But despite these diﬀerences, the author of The Legal Imagination
would doubtlessly agree with Trilling’s pronouncement that ‘[u]nless we
insist that politics is imagination and mind, we will learn that imagination
and mind are politics, and of a kind that we will not like’58 – an admonition
that regrettably has lost nothing of its timeliness.
My second comment pertains to the optimism of the tone and orientation
of the book, and it leads to a sense of irony. To the extent that The Legal
Imagination arguably represents an eﬀort to expand the reach of liberal education – to imagine legal education as a form of liberal education – it feels (to
me at least) as though it does so from a position that assumes that the good of
liberal education is an established faith that can be built upon and expanded.
That assumption is no longer a given, if it ever was; today, in many quarters of
higher education in the United States, one would ﬁrst have to do considerable
work to create a space for the vision of education that inspires and moves
throughout White’s text in order to be able to receive the text. And this
leads to the sense of a two-fold irony about the text’s reception. White
could not have anticipated that the text would come to be viewed, as it
has been by many, as the seminal text of the ‘Law and Literature’ movement
in legal and literary studies. From the perspective of a commitment to undergraduate Liberal Arts education, the irony is that one of the reasons (there are
many) that there has been receptivity in some quarters of our institutional
precincts to ‘Law and Literature’ as an initiative is precisely that the coupling
suggests a possible way to deliberalize liberal education – or to put it diﬀerently, and more bluntly, to make the study of literature relevant (and institutionally viable) by tying it directly to a profession.
There are of course many ways to bring the study of law into the liberal arts
without imperilling their liberality. On its most basic, least intellectually and
pedagogically adventuresome level, ‘Law and Literature’ can be conceptualized simply as a useful thematic grouping: one does not need to be a specialist
in literature to grasp that themes of law, equity, justice, revenge, punishment
and scenes of judgment – to name but a few of the common tropes of Law
and Literature studies – are at the heart of much literature. In other words,
for some of us it can be an institutionally useful way of naming what we
already do. (My default, elevator-ride/cocktail party answer when I’m asked
by a non-specialist what it is that I do in my teaching and scholarship on
‘Law and Literature’ is that I focus attention on how questions of law and
justice are represented in literature; it seems to do the job.) But I do believe
that this interdisciplinary pairing does carry with it both a promise and the
57
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possibility of a risk with respect to liberal education. I say this is from an interested position: my understanding is that the tenure-track line that made my
own hire possible was able to clear the internal hurdles to funding at the
higher administrative levels of the institution precisely because of the professional – or professional-sounding – orientation of the specialization in
Law and Literature for which the position called. (Lines in ‘Literature and
Health’ and ‘Literature and Science’ were funded at the same time, under
the same auspices.)
This leads to the second irony, or unintended consequence, of the reception and inﬂuence of The Legal Imagination. In the context of retrenchment
and a receding commitment to liberal education, ‘Law and Literature’ – if
The Legal Imagination is the vehicle – can be a kind of Trojan Horse, a way
to insert liberal learning back into the undergraduate curriculum. (Though
White intended The Legal Imagination as a textbook for an advanced course
in law school, I could readily envision incorporating parts of it into an
advanced undergraduate Composition course.) Indeed, I know of no text
more moved by a love of liberal learning or more practically committed to fostering a developmental experience of it. White imagines the practice of law as
a form of practical wisdom, and more speciﬁcally, as a skilful, individual practice of excellence in the art of writing. He aims for students to move beyond a
merely instrumental command of the rhetorical conventions of the discipline
of Law to an embodied, authoritative, individual voice that calls and empowers them to say what they mean, mean what they say, and have something to
say – an aspiration that evokes the classical standard of eloquence (logos,
pathos, ethos) and expresses as clear and distinct of a commitment to
liberal learning as one will ﬁnd. Whenever I read The Legal Imagination, I am
returned to what called me to the profession, the love that too often dares
not speak its name in Higher Education in the United States: the love of
teaching.
This leaves me to oﬀer my ﬁnal comment about what we might learn
further from the text today, speciﬁcally with respect to what it oﬀers for an
understanding of how to view the enterprise of Law and Literature. If we
work empirically, that is, from a set of observations about what the text is
and how it operates, then we are led to a series of possible claims, insights,
or conclusions about what Law and Literature is and how it originates.
(I recognize that there are several sources for Law and Literature as a movement.) First, Law and Literature is a practice of writing, one that imagines
the practice of law as an art and the education of the law student as a form
of liberal learning. Second, Law and Literature is practice of teaching, one
that depends upon a series of relationships: the student-teacher relationship;
the relationship between the student and the texts that she is asked to read;
and the student’s relationship with her own writing and emergent practice,
voice, and style as a legal writer and actor. Third, Law and Literature is a
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practice of asking open-ended questions, questions that are neither didactic
nor Socratic but heuristic. All three of these aspects of the course that The
Legal Imagination supports are clear in the assignments throughout the
book, but perhaps most notably in the second writing assignment (‘Controlling a Writing System’ in Chapter 1: The Lawyer as Writer). The assignment
has three parts or moments. White asks the student ﬁrst to ‘identify a
passage of legal or nonlegal literature which you consider good writing’;
then to ‘explain your judgment of the passage’; and then, self-reﬂexively, to
ask of their own written explanation ‘[i]s that good writing as you have
deﬁned it? Can you rewrite it so that it is?’59 He follows this with a paragraph
of meta-commentary that opens with a statement in italics that anticipates
the student’s potential unease with the open-endedness of the method and
emphasizes its intentionality:
If there is one assignment that sets the problem of the whole course, this is it. It
could hardly be repeated too often.
You may feel that you ought to be given more guidance with this question, and
in fact some proposed approaches follow shortly. But the essential uncertainty in
this and many of the other assignments in this book is deliberate: it is my hope
to ask questions that are incomplete, that do not imply an answer, that ask you
to ﬁnish making the question as you work out your response to it. You are not
being asked, that is, to approximate some answer I have in mind, or to write
along any set lines at all; instead of telling you what to do, these questions
are meant to push you oﬀ to make your own way in your own direction. A considerable measure of the energy upon which the course proceeds must come
from you. This is an invitation to talk about the writer’s excellence in any way
that interests you. If you feel at a loss as to how to proceed, the following suggestions may help60.

White does subsequently provide suggestions to support and guide the
student as she works through the open-endedness of the experience that
his questions frame. But it is telling that his comments, in the above, indicate
that the student’s ‘response’ entails ﬁnishing ‘making the question’, not resolving it. Indeed, though White may not share Trilling’s (pace Henry James)
‘imagination of disaster’, the following, clear-eyed summative moment, in
Chapter 6: The Imagination of the Lawyer, makes plain that an experience
of the legal imagination is an ineluctable, existential experience of collapse:
You might sum up the experience this course oﬀers by saying that it is an experience in the collapse of language under strain: the collapse not only of the legal
language, but of the other languages that you have used (of psychology, of
blame, of social organization, of explanation, of criticism, of paper-writing, and
so on). You have experienced what could be called the central frustration of
writer and lawyer, the perpetual breaking down of language in your hands as
59
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you try to use it. None of our language seems to be able to do what it promises,
none can bear the stresses of our demands for truth and order and justice. Such,
it seems to me, are the conditions of our existence61.

White’s answer to the experience of collapse that his text at once represents
and reproduces – what one might call the Whitean sublime – has many facets,
layers, and dimensions, but there are, as he indicates, two main ideas. First, he
proposes that we think of law as ‘an imaginative activity and its art a literary
one’62. Second, a useful way forward for the student-lawyer, as she works to
‘ﬁnish making the question’, is for her to imagine her activity ‘rather as the
making of a metaphor than as, say, a proposal for a solution or a
program’63. The emphasis on the positive, constitutive possibilities of metaphor – along with the tropes of irony and ambiguity – for the cultivation of
an individual’s structure of feeling expresses White’s afﬁnity with the New Criticism and runs throughout the book. In the same chapter in which the abovecited assignment appears, White asks the student, ‘[c]an you see legal
language as a metaphor?’64 Later in the chapter he pushes further, with an
implied self-reﬂexive question that makes plain just how ethically committed
White is to his students’ ﬂourishing, how much he is willing to claim for the
ambit of legal education and for what is at stake in a life in the law:
I hope you have a sense of living a metaphor, and you repeatedly ask yourself
whether what you say or do sustains the meaning you try to give it. T.S. Eliot
said in a famous phrase of Hamlet that it failed as a play because Shakespeare
never found an ‘objective correlative’ in the world of dramatic action that was
adequate to his meaning. And we all know people who make noble claims for
the meaning of what they do, which we regretfully ﬁnd unsustained65.

This passage encodes a considerable irony. I am thinking, here, of what the philosopher Jonathan Lear says about irony as the experience of coming up short with
respect to ideals that govern or orient our self-conception – an essential experience that we have come to terms with as we practice the art of being human:
The possibility of irony arises when a gap opens between pretense as it is made
available in a social practice and an aspiration or ideal which, on the one hand, is
embedded in the pretense – indeed, which expresses what the pretense is all
about – but which, on the other hand, seems to transcend the life and social
practice in which that pretense is made. The pretense seems at once to
capture and miss the aspiration. That is, in putting myself forward as a
teacher – or whatever the relevant practical identity – I simultaneously instantiate a determinate way of embodying the identity and fall dramatically short of
the very ideals that I have, until now, assumed to constitute the identity.66
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Lear’s words about irony and the example he gives of a teacher are particularly
relevant for what they reveal about White as a teacher and the achievement of
The Legal Imagination. If I read White correctly, metaphor, as both an act of
imagination and a trope of writing, is a wise, skilful response that can answer
our experience of irony as we live out a relationship with a life of the law and
beyond. As we have seen, it is tied to an art of making questions that does
not forestall a lived experience of the collapse of language as we make, create
– the experience of our own coming up short. The irony with respect not only
to the above passage but indeed the text as a whole is that The Legal Imagination
does not come up short; rather, it stands as a realized metaphor, the ‘objective
correlative’ to the questions that constitute it. It does not tell; it shows. It demonstrates the integrity that it fosters. It is the precipitate and legacy of a life well lived,
for which many of us have been grateful over the years and for which many
others to come will now have opportunity to be, too, thanks to republication
of the book. To me today, every bit as much as when I ﬁrst encountered it, The
Legal Imagination stands as a sublime, astonishing monument, an at once
exhilarating and nearly-overwhelming testament to the possibilities of liberal
learning: it is living speech. In my view, there is no higher praise.

Jack L. Sammons, ‘The Legal Imagination and human rights’
Recently I was asked by a very dear friend to oﬀer a response to a paper by
Baroness Onora O’Neil at an international seminar on cosmopolitanism and
national identity.67 I am going to ask you to read four short edited sections
of my response here before connecting what I say in these to The Legal
Imagination:
The human rights community, it has been argued, should seek justiﬁcation for
the universality of most of the rights it proclaims rather than acting, as
perhaps has been done, simply on the authority of their adoption by some
international organization including of course the United Nations. Their universality must be justiﬁed, the argument goes on, because we intended to
apply these rights universally. The authority of adoption is not enough for
this for there is a diﬀerence between the existence of a law and its merits
or demerits. This is sensible, yes, but it seems to me that adoption and justiﬁcation of rights are related matters. Adoptions of human rights as wide spread
as these are based at least in part on our experience with these rights including our experience with attempts at justiﬁcation. Thus, rather than simply an
assertion of authority regarding their universality, adoptions by a suﬃciently
wide consensus, as with the Universal Declaration, can be considered evidence
of universality. I don’t mean the authority of agreement alone, for there could
be a universal right only one person accepts because universality is at least in
67
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part a claim of objectivity or valid intersubjectivity, or some other way of
getting to matters of social truth. I do mean, however, that wide spread adoption and agreement is prima facie evidence of the givenness of these rights as
universally normative even if politically disputed by some. It is in fact the sort
of evidence that any justiﬁcation, if it is to remain within a social framework,
should consider. Thus, adoption of a right as a human right, when it reﬂects
wide spread agreement, is suﬃcient by itself not to prove universality or
even to be considered adequate authority for that, but to create a burden
of persuasion on those who would deny its application to particular parties
in particular circumstances.
It is important to recognize this, I think, because it is the existence of this
burden of persuasion that is both necessary and suﬃcient to initiate the social
institutional process by which we interpret, apply, and explore the justiﬁcation
of rights if we are to do these well: our judicial systems. And the need to focus
our eﬀorts upon the mostly neglected judicial role – mostly neglected, that is,
other than in international individual criminal prosecutions – will be my main
thesis throughout.
One would think then, if we are to be serious about having rights which are
universal, the focus of the human rights community would be on this – the
courts and the judiciary – and, in fact, there is much work needed, not just
to protect the independence of the judiciary, but also to encourage both international and domestic courts to be, in Jeremy Waldron’s terms, ‘stewards of
[this] singular enterprise’.68 But this focus isn’t there at all. In fact, courts
and the judiciary are almost entirely ignored in the academic literature
much of which conﬂates law and politics and in doing so inadvertently undermine all claims about human rights as legal rights.
**
This sort of social institutional deliberation in which we respect the reasoned
commitments of others is a fundamental moral commitment entailed by any
set of human rights – adjudication rather than violence. The speciﬁc derived
rights in regards to this duty include the right to an independent judiciary,
both in the sense of being independent from political pressure and judges
having the independency of thought judicial judgment requires. (There are
many other derived rights we could mention here, equality of access and of
standing of the parties before the court – a grant of juridical status best reﬂecting in an acceptable social and institutional form the fact that human rights are
granted to ‘persons’ – the preservation of the language and the conversation in
which arguments are considered, the right to the information necessary for adjudication, the right of justiﬁcation, the right of publicity of reasons by the courts,
and so forth – all of which are required for the integrity of the interpretation and
justiﬁcation – but time doesn’t permit elaboration.)
**
But is it possible to have judicial interpretation of this sort in regards to human
rights? One hears often about the indeterminacy of principles in this regard, an
68
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indeterminacy which, outside of language games, goes all the way down. The
indeterminacy of principles in international human rights, however, is not that
diﬀerent from the indeterminacy of principles in domestic rights. There it is
not only not a serious problem but is a serious beneﬁt in denying all ﬁnality,
making it clear that the social tasks of interpretation and justiﬁcation are
always ongoing and, accordingly, what is of most importance is the preservation
of the language and the conversation in which these can occur. Yes, there is
more of a shared culture domestically, but that is exaggerated in many cases.
What is shared domestically, however, is a judicial culture emerging from the
practice of judging. And that is very important to note for our purposes here
because, internationally, we are living in a time in which diﬀerences among us
in regards to this culture are less, not greater, than ever before.
One would think then, once again, that if we are interested in addressing the
issue of ﬁnding consistency in the interpretation of human rights that our initial
focus would be on ways of promoting an internationally shared judicial culture
and protecting it. There are those who perhaps recognize this potential, but
reject it because treating judicial decisions by particular local courts as authoritative would seem to violate the universality that deﬁnes human right. But if
we are talking about authoritative decisions, as opposed to authoritarian ones,
this doesn’t seem true to me. Judgments which are authoritative within the judicial practice, oﬀered in the form of written opinions, are not in tension with the
universality of human rights. They are instead the way in which universality is
done when it is done as a social matter.
This should be resonant with Kantians, although you don’t need to be one to
accept it. There are many ways to present this thought, but let me use the quickest. The potential universality of judicial judgments is the same as the potential
universality of all aesthetic judgments because there is an art of the judicial in
which its judgments are the product of very disciplined intuitions arising from
the materials of the art within an ‘enlarging mentality’69 using ‘intuition’ here
similar to the way Robert Audi does.70
What this means is that with each judgment there is a tacit assertion that
anyone with suﬃcient knowledge and experience within the practice, given
the same materials and context, and regardless of cultural diﬀerences, would
come to the same decision. There is, for example, nothing about the music of
Beethoven that would exclude someone from any other culture from acquiring
through experience and knowledge within the practice of music the capability
of hearing, as many do, that each note of the later string quartets was inevitable
given what came before and what came after each one, and yet many of these
‘inevitable’ notes were, for Beethoven disciplined intuitive aesthetic judgments
at what seemed to be musical impasses. These intuitions would come upon him,
as they do for good and experienced judges trying to be true to their art, as a
matter of poiesis. Now of course these judicial judgments can be mistaken,
there can be judgments in opposition and so forth, for judgments can go
wrong. But that’s the point. They are part of a communicative process in
which we can know what ‘going wrong’ means and have available to us a
69
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language and conversation for ongoing correction.
What is required here, as you can readily see, is the sharing of a judicial practice. But, of course, judicial opinions turn ﬁrst not to justiﬁcation – those are rhetorical aids at interpretation – but to precedents and many turn upon them. But
then so will any social institutional eﬀort towards consistency of interpretation
for this is very reason we turn to precedents. You cannot, I think, hold on to
the evolution of the meaning of words used, to the conversations required for
this, or to any integrity in their application without considering precedents.
Rather than going on about this, however, let it just lead us to a more general
point.
**
I have neglected here the problem of enforcement entirely although there is
much to say about the eﬃcacy of judgment itself, and I’ve said nothing for Kantians about why these judicial judgments are aesthetic judgments despite being
rule based. Nor have I even mentioned the problem of developing local trust of
what may be distant judicial systems or the moral problems created by rights
talk. Instead of these, however, I want to conclude quickly with a hopeful
note about practices. The judiciary as a practice is not just an enclave against
uncertainty, although it can be that. Practices give to us a way of thinking
which each practice has on oﬀer.71 Through their elaboration practices bring
things into their own. They ‘gather’ in Heidegger’s wonderfully poetic term,
and thus tend to connect to the rest of the community’s life in ways such that
the practice (and the character it requires) is thought to be worthy. This is an
autonomous tendency, only a tendency, a ‘gentle law’ as Heidegger described
it. Nevertheless, through it, the stability of practices tends to become the stability of our lives. What the judicial practice has on oﬀer, I think, can expand over
the world in a cosmopolitan manner and oﬀer the best hope we have for integrity within a system of internationally recognized human rights and, out of an
increased appreciation for this practice and eﬀorts to preserve it, could come
the capability of our living into those rights.
*

*

*

These sections, as you can see, contain no mention of The Legal Imagination. So why oﬀer them here? It is because they are almost unimaginable
without Jim’s book, derived as they are from what I have always considered
the central chapter of that marvelous work: ‘Is The Judge Really A Poet’.72
After agonizing over things I might now wish to say about a book that was
formative for me and so many others, I realized what I wanted to say to
White is that his work will continue, and I knew of no better way than to
oﬀer yet another example of how it has and an implicit suggestion to
others of how it might.
There are a few things to note here to make the connections clearer. The
conception of law inherent in the response, law as manifesting itself with a
71
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mysterious authoritativeness both beyond us and yet of our own creation, is
there in part because if you ask the question ‘What is law if judges are poets?’
you will eventually arrive at something very close to this conception or so it
seems to me. And, of course, the central thought in the response, the one
linking White’s work to the fundamental problem of the universality of
human rights, i.e. ‘The potential universality of judicial judgments is the
same as the potential universality of all aesthetic judgments because there
is an art of the judicial in which its judgments are the product of very disciplined intuitions arising from the materials of the art within an “enlarging
mentality” …’ is but an extension of White’s thoughts for there is nothing in
those thoughts necessarily limiting them to our culture or even to our time.
Note as well that the phrase, ‘judgments are the products of very disciplined intuitions arising from the materials of the art within an “enlarging
mentality,”’ can also be considered a description of the judgments in
poetry. The Arendtian phrase, ‘enlarging mentality’, was part of her struggle
with and against Kant on judgment, but, it seems to me, in this she was
moving towards an understanding of the fullness, the synesthetic nature if
you will, of good judgment, the one revealing our reciprocal relationship
with that which is not self (and therefore more fully human) that one could
ﬁnd more readily in Frost.73 And perhaps she was saying as well that at
their best our truth-aspiring judgments unfold in dialogue with the truthaspiring judgments of others as they do in law, something one could ﬁnd
more readily in, say, Harlan. Find in both cases, that is, with White’s help.
I could go on with this if space permitted, but I am also sure that if you are
reading this and were trained by The Legal Imagination you could as well. Consider for one example that both the language of poetry and of law create and
depend upon what Robin Skelton described as ‘spatial words’,74 ones used not
to evoke only one or two of their possibilities of meaning, but words that ‘seems
to operate as a unity of all [their] power’.75 Consider for a second, and in regards
to precedence, that good poets turn to the ‘materials of the art’ in much the
same way that good judges do: not for rigorous conformity to what has
gone before (and with it in law a parochialism incompatible with international
human rights), for such is the deﬁnition of bad poetry, but as a search for that
within the tradition, be it of law or poetry, to which ﬁdelity is owed. And consider for a third, and most importantly, that both poetry and law, as White has
often said,76 force the particular upon us, and notice that in this very particularity, this search for what is unique in each human situation in both law and
poetry, we can ﬁnd the core of all human rights.
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At the end of my response at the conference, one rather well known academician serving as an advisor to the World Bank asked, facetiously, ‘And who
are these amazing judges, Jack?’ The right response is that they are ordinary
people trying hard to do well their job as preservers of law. But that ‘well’
assumes all that White has taught me over the years. I realized at that
moment that I could not oﬀer an adequate answer for the diﬀerence
between us. For human rights issues are not truly matters of rights and
duties, although these can be important, but of imagination, of art, and of
the alterity which made us and makes us human. They are, that is, matters
of poetry. And in this there is the hope that is central to White’s work,
White’s faith, and White’s life.

Thomas D. Eisele, ‘law as a literature’
There are many ways to think about law. Law can be thought of as the inherited deposit of our societal forms and customs. Law can be thought of as the
word of God, made manifest to humans through revelation, or an inspired
text. Law can be seen as an instrument, a way to eﬀect social change, or to
enforce societal conformity to certain prescribed norms. Law can be seen as
a system of rules, or as a schema of rules and principles, or as the sovereign’s
commands backed by sanctions, or as a series of conditional commands
backed by the force of an underlying Grundnorm. From time to time, law
has been seen (and written about) in these, and many other, ways.
How else might we conceive of law? It may occur to us that law is a way of
making sense of life, at least of that substantial subset of life that we call our
‘social existence’. We make sense of it by writing about this portion of our
lives, our human existence; and these writings in a sense constitute a form
of literature. Humans grapple with reality and with existence by wording
the world in which they ﬁnd themselves. As we humans go about our lives
and exist within any given society or social set, we ﬁnd ourselves rubbing
shoulders with other humans, and even non-human corporate and collective
entities. And we confront governments too. We ﬁnd ourselves a part of those
states, subject to their writs and injunctions and rejoinders. All of this rich
social enterprise is a mass of experience: frequently, even obsessively, we
ﬁnd ourselves categorizing it, organizing it into words. Some subset of
these words is used within legal texts or forms.
This wording-the-world is an activity of organizing ourselves and others
and our multiple actions, labelling actions, integrating them into our lives,
to the point where we thereby build and constitute ourselves. This activity
also is a way of adjusting ourselves to others and their actions, their wishes,
their desires. Sometimes we organize life by issuing rules; sometimes we
organize ourselves by following customs; sometimes we organize others by
appealing to norms; sometimes we organize our thoughts by searching for
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underlying principles; sometimes we interact with others by ﬁat or command;
sometimes we order our lives on conditional or unconditional bases. In ordering our experience, we are making it comprehensible. (Kant would say it could
not be experience, could not count as experience, if it were not categorized.)
We are making sense of it, and of ourselves, and of our lives, and of the
societies and the collectives of which we ﬁnd ourselves to be members. (Or
ﬁnd ourselves not to be members. Perhaps we ﬁnd ourselves to be out of
bounds, out-laws.)
White asks us to consider law as a literature. He begins his book, The Legal
Imagination: Studies in the Nature of Legal Thought and Expression, with this idea:
We shall look at the literature of the law as a literature of the imagination of
which [certain] questions can be asked, both directly and by comparing it
with other literatures.77

Seeing law as a literature means that, for example, we might consider the
decisions and statutes in a particular area of law to constitute one of the
topics to be discussed within this literature. We have, for example, novels of
morals and manners in English literature, and other literatures. Might we
now consider criminal law or antitrust law or torts to be comprehensible as
sketching ways to behave in society, or what constitutes misbehaviour in
certain social settings? Similarly, we have books about people’s achievements
and their social status. Might we usefully consider the law of wills, and contract law, and property law as another literature teaching us ways to
achieve certain goals in society, or to gain a certain social status or standing?
English and American literature abounds with stories of mergers and acquisitions, of someone being a corporate man or woman, or of not being a socalled ‘organization man’. Here too, if we look to the law, we ﬁnd it speaking
of certain entities in society, in trust law, partnership and agency, and corporate law. Is this a literature too? Many novels deal with matters of state, either
as an insider or as an outsider, as a proponent or an opponent of a given
society or social setting. Similarly, constitutional law and local government
law, and even administrative law, give us glimpses of how we can relate to
levels or types of government, and of various ways of governing by monarchy
or oligarchy or democracy or tyranny. What does it mean to be a citizen or a
non-citizen? Even, what does it portend to be a revolutionary, an over-thrower
of state and government? In exploring these questions, we may ﬁnd insight in
novels, in poems, in letters, in diaries, in treatises, in cases, in statutes, or in
regulations. Is any single literate source deﬁnitive or dispositive as a source
of illumination in such matters? We may consult Kafka’s The Trial to tell us
about the machinery of the legal system and its approximation towards
justice; or, we may gain our knowledge and understanding of such matters
77
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by consulting cases and regulations dealing with conﬂicts of law, civil procedure, and, again, constitutional law. Are they not all literatures of a kind?
One strategy White adopts is to ask the student/reader to assume the role
of judge or legislator or administrator, and then to write something as such a
person, such an oﬃcial. This strategy forces the writer to think about what
resources are there, by means of which to ﬁnd one’s voice in the role
adopted. This question is posed in terms of the genre in which we are
trying to speak, trying to write. What resources does this form of expression
hold? What possibilities, what constraints, what options, what omissions?
How are we to eﬀect something in the world legally? How does one own a
legally eﬀective voice? White wishes to explore that question. ‘In the course
of the book the student is asked to write as lawyer, judge, and legislator,
and to reﬂect as a mind and a person on what he [or she] has done’.78
The main forms of expression for the literature of the law are genres having
their own internal coherence and principles: judicial opinions, statutes, codiﬁcations, regulations, letters of legal opinion, advisory opinions, and executive
orders. These legal genres are simultaneously forms of expression, forms of
experience, and forms of understanding. What they express may be accurate,
but it is always partial. The experience they capture may be veridical, but it
cannot be comprehensive. The understanding they encompass may be
correct, but it cannot be ﬁnal or complete.
As White puts it, the student/reader who becomes a legal writer ‘is asked to
see what the lawyer does as a literary activity, as an enterprise of the imagination, with respect to which both success and failure – if he can deﬁne them
– are possibilities for him [or her]’.79 Speciﬁcally, how does White encourage
his reader to consider law as a literature? Here are four speciﬁc examples
drawn from his book:
I. In chapter 2, White presents ‘a comparative anthology on death’. He begins
with the Georgetown Hospital case as a paradigm of how the judicial literature of the law speaks about a particular patient dying. In this respect, we
are shown how directors at a collegiate institution, and physicians at a hospital, manage to speak about someone in their care and custody; and we
also are shown how judges dealing with the case manage to speak
about and to dispose of the issues presented them. What of the patient
in that case? What of his or her relatives? How are they spoken of, in
what terms, with what care and compassion and comprehension? Do we
have eyes to see and ears to hear? Do we have words to eﬀect what
happens here? In the same chapter, we are given a series of ways to
speak about death, including some wills, but also some poems. How
78
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does the genre of wills (we are asked) allow us, or force us, to speak about
someone’s death? What does this genre teach us about how someone
anticipates and plans for his or her own death? And might wills – or
poems – have their own powers of expression, yet also their own limits
of expression? Might they enrich our experience of our own mortality,
and yet simultaneously impoverish our expression of that experience,
when we are trying to cope with the death of others, or our own impending
death? What are the perceived strengths and admitted weaknesses of any
such genre, as a means of expression and thought and comprehension?
II. Later in chapter 2, we are asked to examine how a statute works. White
looks at the genre of a statute as one way in which a legislator attempts
to organize and deﬁne future human experience. The statute as a form of
expression is seen as a social instrument that establishes the terms by
which the makers of the statute cooperate with their audience, people
who are intended to behave in accordance with that statute. A statute
can establish such terms of cooperation by deﬁning the issues that are
important (and by denying or ignoring issues thought to be irrelevant).
What exactly is the matter at hand, the topic or subject being addressed
by this particular statute? How does the statute-maker speak to the
people who are meant to obey and carry out the statute? This activity
of deﬁning terms and stating issues within a statute becomes one way
to establish a relationship of cooperation between the statute-makers
and the audience for the statute (what White calls ‘a way of giving structure to conversations’ between the statute-writer and the statute-reader).
White also looks at the limits of statutes as a genre or a literary form, in the
subsection where he examines certain ﬁctions created by the rhetoric
used within a statute. White also asks us in what way this rhetoric can
be controlled by us and (implicitly) in what way this rhetoric still
manages to control us, or otherwise is beyond our control. (One of the
recognized staying-powers of any ﬁctional form is, I suppose, the twin
fact that simultaneously we can seem to control it while it still controls us.)
III. In chapter 3, the main topic is ‘the way institutions talk about people’.
Here White concentrates most of our attention on how people are
spoken about, or labelled, when a case involves a defence plea of insanity. Statutes, the model penal code, the American Law Institute, and
cases are consulted in this regard, as are excerpts from Marais and
Emily Dickson and others. Yet, after a decision is made in such a case,
we also have the sentencing decision, which may or may not be
guided by rigid rules and labels. Here again, cases and statutes are examined, as are Clarendon’s History and Austen’s Pride and Prejudice. Correctional facilities also come within White’s scrutiny, and so too the
language of race and racial labels. All of these topics are pursued from
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within the perspective of studying the law as a kind of literature itself,
and also as compared with other literatures.
IV. In chapters 5 and 6, we study how judges make and express their judgments in speciﬁc cases. We also explore how the judicial opinion explaining the judgments made, can be considered to be its own genre of legal
thought and expression. White looks at the relation between judgments
and rules, and between judgments and reasons or rationality, and then
he presents a formidable case for analysis: Griswold v. Connecticut, with
its mind-numbing penumbras. The opening portion of chapter 6 then
elaborates this problem by asking, ‘Is the judge really a poet?’ and by
comparing and contrasting judicial opinions with several poems.
Finally, later in chapter 6, judicial opinions also may be seen as narratives, since they tell a story. This further connection is followed up by
studying historical narratives, and comparing and contrasting them
with several judicial opinions.
This, in a nutshell, is the core of White’s claim that law can be seen and understood as a literature. Students of law may ﬁnd these connections fascinating;
or they may ﬁnd them unhelpful, unenlightening.
My own experience with discovering White’s book came after my time in
law school, when I started to practice law in a large Chicago law ﬁrm. My reaction to his book was one of heart-felt relief and sudden empowerment. Why?
White’s lessons helped me as a lawyer to read legal documents and instruments in a more engaged and knowledgeable manner. The book tutored me
on what I might expect in any given opinion or statute or advisory letter, and
what to look for in each genre of legal thought and expression. It was only
when I had that knowledge banked within me, that I came to recognize
certain lacks, or oversights, in the writings that daily I had to consume as a
legal professional. My engagement with legal materials was enhanced.
My comprehension improved too. Perhaps initially the improved engagement led to the improved comprehension, but eventually the two became
mutually supportive and empowering. If we engage better with legal
materials, we understand more; and as we understand more, our engagement
with those materials becomes more fervid. I am but one witness. For me personally, I can only say that, without the knowledge that I gained from White’s
book, I felt professionally dead upon graduating from law school. Yet, once
this knowledge was gained, I felt professionally vibrant.
I did not stay long in law practice, but over time I did gravitate to law teaching, where I spent 30 years trying to help my students to see law as a kind of
literature. With such a view, I believe that law students can become more
astute critics of any given legal document. If we learn the internal logic or
grammar of a given legal genre, this allows us to better comprehend what
any given legal document is doing. Or, at least, what it is intended to do,
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regardless of the actual achievement or failure the legal document enacts.
Consequently, we can better criticize the document as a legal product.
There is another potential beneﬁt, I believe, that White’s Legal Imagination
makes available to those of us who study and practice law. In a long series of
studies comprising section xi of Part II of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein explores what it means to ‘see something as something’. Probably
the most famous instance he studies is a ﬁgure that we can see as an
outline of a duck or as an outline of a rabbit. I do not profess to understand
all of the lessons or implications of Wittgenstein’s eﬀorts here to reach understanding. I do think it worthwhile, however, to remember in this respect that
White is not drawing an equivalence between law and literature. White is not
claiming an identity between law and literature. He is proposing a way of
‘seeing-as’, a way of understanding, for whatever clarity and comprehension
it may be worth.
Some readers may feel that this suggestion on White’s part misleads us; in
particular, that it ignores or neglects the politics and the power of law. I for
one would not want to see such neglect happen. But might we take
White’s suggestion as an invitation to reconsider what power there is in any
literature? As well, might he also be inviting us to reconsider the politics
that may be hidden or implicit within any literary eﬀort or artifact? What do
we miss, or neglect, if we fail to see law ‘as’ a kind of literature? I wonder.

Linda L. Berger, ‘the metaphor of the opinion as a poem’
This essay takes up James Boyd White’s suggestion that we consider the
judicial opinion as a poem.80 When Professor White made this suggestion
in The Legal Imagination, he was asking us to think in metaphor rather
than analogy. Analogy might support a literal comparison of opinion and
poem, but metaphor oﬀers a ‘way of asking new questions and expressing
new hopes’.81
What questions emerge when we think of the opinion as a poem and its
author as a poet? The ﬁrst is a question that accompanies all metaphor, for
we know that metaphor is both light and darkness and not in equal parts.
Even as metaphor opens imagination, it leads to partial blindness. Thinking
of the judge as a poet illuminates the writer, her eye, hand, and voice. As it
focuses attention on the author’s expression in a text, it is likely to cast
shadows over the setting and subjects of the text. Thinking of the opinion
as a poem lights up structure, style, syntax, and language, but it could
obscure our view of actions and consequences. By highlighting exposition
of one perspective, the metaphor may cloak its suppression of others.
80
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This suggestion is one of the ways Professor White prompted his readers in
The Legal Imagination to consider themselves as writers ‘who live[] by the
power of … imagination’. The demands on the lawyer’s imagination begin,
he suggested, the moment the lawyer meets another person in a legal
setting, and asks herself who is this person? and how am I to understand this
situation? To answer these questions, the lawyer exercises her ‘social and narrative imagination’, the imagination that allows her to ‘envision diﬀerent versions of the future’.82

Images and imagination
Embedded metaphors obstruct imagination when we unthinkingly accept
their implications as normal and inevitable.83 The image of men and
women living out their lives in separate spheres is an ancient example. According to historian Linda Kerber, ‘the habit of contrasting the ‘worlds’ of men and
of women, the allocation of the public sector to men and the private sector
(still under men’s control) to women is older than western civilization’.84
Already ‘deeply embedded in classical Greek thought’, the concept was transported to America among the trappings of various European cultures. Writing
in the 1880s, Alexis de Tocqueville described young middle-class women in
America as independent until married, but once married, ‘the inexorable
opinion of the public carefully circumscribes [her] within the narrow circle
of domestic interests and duties and forbids her to step beyond it’.85
Long-established research and writing practices of lawyers and judges
similarly constrict the circle of legal imagination. Professor White asks why
the judge goes on writing and why the reader goes on reading after the
judge proclaims and the reader grasps a simple statement of the rule. ‘At
its best the judicial mind does more than this … its expression deﬁnes and
exempliﬁes an education. … As for the reader, if the message really were
the meaning, he would stop at the West headnotes’.86 The practice of constructing and categorizing headnotes – a method of classifying legal principles created by commercial publishers to assist in research – assumes that
the meaning of an opinion can be reduced to a paraphrase of the legal principles expressed in the case. Although headnotes are neither written by
judges nor oﬃcially part of any judicial decision, legal readers accept their
implicit inclusion because they unfailingly appear at the beginning of judicial
opinions available in print and electronic form. These familiar practices and
82
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conventions inﬂuence our unconscious understanding of how the law is
constituted.

Re-imagined judicial opinions
A poem helps the mind play with its well-trod patterns of thought, and can even
help reroute those patterns by making us see the familiar anew.87

Over the last ﬁfteen years, nearly a dozen feminist judgments projects have
been initiated around the world. Organized by collaborative groups of legal
academics, practicing lawyers, a few judges, activists, artists, and other scholars, the purpose of these projects has been to re-imagine and to demonstrate
– by writing shadow or ‘missing’ judgments – how important legal issues
might have been decided differently by decision makers who applied feminist
perspectives.88
Challenging the inevitability of what is is the premise of the feminist judgments projects. Although they rely on the facts and law that existed at the
time of the original opinions, the opinion writers explore diﬀerent ways of
seeing and saying. Feminist judgments uncover expanded or more speciﬁc
facts about the dispute or the legal issues involved in the lawsuit itself; they
may rely on social and historical facts that place the current dispute into a
larger context, on sources of authority other than case law and statutes, or
on reasoning methods that grow out of feminist and critical inquiry.
Readers who depend on the headnotes prepared by Lexis and Westlaw to
understand the meaning of a judicial opinion will ﬁnd a series of summarized
‘rules’, but they will learn little or nothing about the people or events who
became the subjects of the opinion; the larger social, historical, or cultural
setting; or the arguments made in the dissenting and concurring opinions.
These are among the overlooked components that aﬀect the evolution of
the law that have been brought to light by the authors of the rewritten feminist judgments.
One example can be found in the feminist rewrite of Bradwell v. Illinois,89
the United States Supreme Court opinion upholding the Illinois decision not
to allow its ﬁrst woman lawyer to practice her profession. Writing a shadow
dissent, Professor Phyllis Goldfarb acknowledged the power of the separate
spheres metaphor, emphasized that the metaphor had long been inaccurate
for, among others, ‘slave women, pioneer women, women who settled the
Mark Yakich, ‘What is a poem? You read it; it reads you’ The Atlantic (25 November 2013).
See Kathryn M Stanchi, Linda L Berger, and Bridget J Crawford (eds), Feminist Judgments: Rewritten
Opinions of the United States Supreme Court (Cambridge University Press 2016). The Women’s Court
of Canada project began in 2004 and published its ﬁrst six rewritten decisions in 2008. That collection
was followed in 2010 by the English collaboration, the Australian project in 2014, the U.S. project in
2016, and the Northern/Irish project and the New Zealand/Aotearoa project in 2017. Under way are
an international law feminist judgments project and projects in Scotland, India, Africa, and Mexico.
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frontiers of this vast nation, women who managed lands and businesses while
men were ﬁghting the Civil War’, and moved on to a diﬀerent legal theory. Her
theory: the Fourteenth Amendment had reconstituted the United States Constitution. It had reconstructed the nation’s governing structure, and in particular the relationship between the federal and state governments and their
citizens. At the centre of this new governance structure and understanding
of the federal-state relationship, Goldfarb created a new concept: any
citizen of the United States should be seen as a federal citizen who is entitled
to protection by the federal government against state incursions into that citizen’s rights.90 In the original Bradwell opinion, the majority followed the
narrow view of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities
Clause that the Court had just adopted in the Slaughter-House Cases.91 Had
Goldfarb’s opinion taken the place of the original, the Fourteenth Amendment
might have become the still-missing essential guarantee of a fundamental
level of privileges and immunities for all American citizens.

Judges are what they write92
After Judge Patricia Wald’s death in early 2019, long-time Supreme Court
reporter Linda Greenhouse described her as a judge who had ‘lived fully
not only in the law but in the world’.93 Before becoming a federal judge,
Judge Wald had clerked, worked for a large law ﬁrm, stayed home with her
children for ten years, practiced public interest law, and been a Department
of Justice attorney. When she left the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, where she was the ﬁrst woman to serve as chief judge, Judge Wald
served on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at
The Hague.
Like Professor White, Judge Wald asked why judges write opinions when
they could simply announce the results. Judges write opinions, she
responded, because explanations are necessary ‘to justify our power’ and to
reassure members of the public that ‘the law will apply to all citizens
alike’.94 Although appellate judges write opinions within the context of
many constraints, including controlling precedent and their colleagues,
Judge Wald emphasized that
judges still use rhetoric to maneuver. The way they present the facts, the way
they describe rules and standards of review, the way they ‘handle’ precedent,
Phyllis Goldfarb, ‘Bradwell v. Illinois’ in Stanchi, Berger, and Crawford (eds), Feminist Judgments (n 9) 60–
77.
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their decisions to write separately or stay with the pack, all provide wide avenues
in which to drive the law forward. A judge’s individual skill at working these
levers of power, and doing so in a way that does not overly antagonize colleagues, continues to have a powerful inﬂuence on decision making. That is
why, in the end, judges – as well as their words – matter so much.95

Writing towards discretion
As Judge Wald put it, judges use rhetoric to drive the law forward in the midst of
constraints. Six years after the implementation of the U.S. federal sentencing
guidelines, she wrote the opinion for a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D. C. Circuit in United States v Clark.96 In the writing, she uncovered a path to discretion, in many ways the heart of judging, despite a statutory
scheme purposefully designed to curtail discretion.97
After being convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and
unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm by a convicted felon, Frank Clark was sentenced to 30 years to life in prison. This sentence appears harsh on its face
given the crimes, so it seemed reasonable for the lower court to use its discretion to ‘depart downward’ and sentence Clark instead to 162 months, or 13
and one-half years. But discretion was diﬃcult to justify under the sentencing
guidelines. Judge Wald remanded for resentencing.
Though neither famous nor known for establishing a new legal principle,98
her opinion reroutes the familiar pattern after opening with the facts about
Clark’s arrest and prior felonies. In a lawful search, the police found ‘drug paraphernalia, a quantity of rocks of ‘crack’ cocaine in ziplock bags totaling 9.22
grams and a 9-mm pistol in a dresser drawer’. Clark was twenty-seven
when he was arrested for the current oﬀence. His three prior felonies? ‘At
age eighteen, Clark committed manslaughter, reportedly in defense [sic] of
his mother’. Shortly thereafter, ‘[w]hile nineteen and awaiting trial on the manslaughter charge, Clark committed an armed street robbery in which he stole
$ 11, a watch, and jewelry’. The third felony took place ‘three years before the
arrest underlying the present conviction [when] Clark was convicted of
attempted distribution of a $ 20 ‘rock’ of cocaine’.99
Judge Wald detailed the grounds for Clark’s requested downward departure from the sentencing guideline: ‘he was the oldest of six children of a
young, unemployed, alcoholic mother on public assistance’ and there was evidence that he ‘was physically abused throughout his childhood’. His father
95
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had been killed ‘when he was an infant, and his siblings were fathered by
various other men. At age eleven, Clark was already a repeat runaway from
home. He had numerous encounters with the juvenile criminal justice
system as a teenager and was repeatedly committed to juvenile residential
institutions’.100
When Judge Wald came to the ﬁnal grounds for the district court’s
decision, its reliance on Clark’s childhood circumstances, she encountered
one obstacle after another.101 First, the district court had not used the
‘magic words “lack of guidance as a youth.”’ Still, the court did cite the
‘special circumstances’ of Clark’s life and those circumstances included violence and an absence of adult guidance. Thus, Judge Wald wrote, the district
court’s ‘ﬁnal ground for departure appears to be based on a combination of
Clark’s status as a child victim of domestic violence and an almost total lack
of parental (or other) guidance in his youth’.
A more serious problem appeared. Shortly after the sentencing by the
trial court, the federal sentencing guidelines were amended to eliminate
the oﬀender’s youthful circumstances – circumstances exactly like the
ones relied on by the lower court – as a ground for departure from the
guidelines. This amendment had not been raised by either party on
appeal, but it certainly would come up at resentencing. Would the amendment apply retroactively? The standard for non-retroactive application is
whether the new guidelines would ‘eﬀect any pertinent substantive
change that disadvantages the defendant’, and Judge Wald emphatically
responded ‘yes’. The amendment ‘removes a substantial amount of judicial
discretion to depart downward. Even though Clark had no assurance at the
time of his oﬀense [sic] that the district court would depart downward
because of his severely disadvantaged childhood, the possibility of such a
departure existed. [The new provision] unconditionally removed that
opportunity…’102
Even though the amendment did not apply retroactively, there was still
a question of whether the district court properly relied on Clark’s childhood
circumstances. A court may depart only in an ‘atypical’ case. On remand,
the district court would be required to ﬁnd ‘some plausible causal nexus
between the lack of guidance and exposure to domestic violence and
the oﬀense [sic] for which the defendant is being sentenced’. Beyond
that, Judge Wald suggested, the lower court could go further: it was also
free to consider ‘whether a nexus exists between the circumstances of
Clark’s childhood and his prior criminal oﬀenses [sic], for purposes of
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determining whether the seriousness of his criminal record is overrepresented’. For example,
If … the court ﬁnds that Clark’s exposure to domestic violence and childhood
abuse signiﬁcantly aﬀected his predisposition to commit his ﬁrst two crimes,
which occurred when he was eighteen and nineteen years old, the district
court could discount his career oﬀender status. Absent the ﬁrst two crimes,
Clark would not have committed the requisite two prior felony drug or violence-related oﬀenses necessary for designation as a career oﬀender, … and
the district court would have additional support for a departure under the overrepresentation prong ….
Finally, the district court may want to contemplate whether Clark’s childhood
exposure to domestic violence is suﬃciently extraordinary to be weighed under
[another provision] which states that mental and emotional conditions are not
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the
applicable Guidelines range. … We recognize that several of our sister circuits
have indicated that [this provision] allows courts to consider childhood abuse
as a basis for departure in extraordinary circumstances.103

Though it would apply narrowly, Judge Wald’s opinion provided an education
in the use of discretion.

Writing with discretion
Writing with fewer constraints, but continuing to justify and reassure, Judge
Wald dissented in Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany.104 First, she established the context with the story of Hugo Princz. When World War II began,
Princz was a sixteen-year-old American Jew trapped in Czechoslovakia, and
when America entered the war:
…the Nazis seized Princz, his parents, his three brothers, and his sister as enemy
aliens.
… forcibly transporting them to the Maidanek concentration camp in Poland,
where Princz and two of his brothers were torn from their parents and sister.
Princz believes that German oﬃcials murdered his parents and sister at the concentration camp in Treblinka; he never saw them again.
… the Nazis transported Princz and his two brothers to the concentration camp
at Auschwitz.
… they stripped Princz of his personal identity–tattooing him with the number
‘36 707’ and requiring him to wear a prisoner’s uniform with ‘USA’ stenciled on
the front.
… The Nazis then ‘leased’ Princz and his brothers to I.G. Farben, a German
chemical cartel, which enslaved the three brothers at a facility known as
103
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Birkenau. … Princz was subjected to the unimaginable horror of watching
oﬃcials intentionally starve them to death at the Birkenau ‘hospital’.
… In October 1944, Princz was again transferred to the immediate custody of
the Nazis and forced on a death march to Dachau, where he was enslaved as
a laborer in the underground Messerschmidt airplane factory.
… Forced onto a cramped cattle train headed toward a mass execution in the
Alps, Princz survived only because of the intervening German surrender.105

After the war, Princz unsuccessfully sought reparations from Germany, but was
denied them because of his American citizenship. In 1992, he ﬁled suit against
Germany in a United States federal court. The district court denied Germany’s
motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The Court of Appeals majority, in an opinion
by then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsberg, found that FSIA provided immunity.
Judge Wald’s dissent argued for retroactive application of FSIA, which was
enacted in 1976 and is the ‘sole means of obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign
state defendant in federal court’.106 But the opinion’s revelation lies in Judge
Wald’s discussion of Germany’s implicit waiver of foreign sovereign immunity.
Here is her explanation: FSIA’s general rule is immunity, followed by exceptions including cases in which the state ‘has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication’. Germany implicitly waived its immunity by engaging in
the ‘barbaric conduct alleged in this case … speciﬁcally by violating the jus
cogens norms of international law condemning enslavement and genocide’.107 These norms are ‘accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole’. Why are these fundamental?
What could be more fundamental than an individual’s right to be free from the
inﬂiction of cruel and sadistic terrors designed with the sole purpose of destroying the individual’s psyche and person because of the national, ethnic, racial, or
religious community to which he belongs? What could be more elementary than
a prohibition against eviscerating a person’s human dignity by thrusting him
into the shackles of slavery?108

Next, her justiﬁcation and reassurance, examining the evolution of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity and undermining the majority’s
reasoning:
Granting a foreign sovereign immunity from jurisdiction has always been a
matter of grace and comity, and is not required by the United States Constitution. … The Supreme Court ﬁrst broached the question of foreign sovereign
immunity in 1812, when it stated that states enjoy ‘exclusive and absolute’ jurisdiction over their own territory. … While Justice Marshall’s seminal opinion is
105
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most often cited for the proposition that foreign sovereigns enjoy virtually absolute immunity from suit in United States courts, … , the decision in fact focused
on the exceptions to exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which stem from a state’s
explicit or implicit consent to be intruded upon. … Such consent derives
from the interest in interstate relations, ‘which humanity dictates and its
wants require’. … .Even in the early nineteenth century, therefore, states recognized that, to facilitate international relations, they must on occasion allow
infringements on their exclusive territorial jurisdiction.109

Finally, she tied international law to United States law: ‘[U]nder international
law, a state waives its right to sovereign immunity when it transgresses a jus
cogens norm’. And under United States precedent, whenever possible, ‘we
must … interpret United States law consistently with international law’.110
Thus, because there was no indication that Congress intended to exclude
such a waiver,
the only way to interpret the FSIA in accordance with international law is to construe the Act to encompass an implied waiver exception for jus cogens violations.
Congress did not intend to thwart the opportunity of an American victim of the
Holocaust to have his claims heard by the United States judicial system. Because
I cannot agree that the FSIA requires us to slam the door in the face of Hugo
Princz, I dissent.111
***

When I read the Bradwell dissent, the Clark majority, and the Princz dissent
through the metaphorical prism of the poem, each becomes an instance of a
judicial author working within the constraints of the law but asking new questions with the beneﬁt of distinctive sources of light. These readings reassure
me of the power of the legal imagination to construct alternative versions
of the future.

Linda Ross Meyer, ‘charitable interpretation: lessons from The
Legal Imagination’
The Legal Imagination is one of those books I can keep by my bedside and
each time I open it, I appreciate a familiar passage with new insight,
because the book outstrips my intellectual journey and always meets me
where I’ve just arrived. In revisiting James Boyd White’s masterwork this
time, I was struck anew by the discussion of ‘The Statute as a Social Instrument: Establishing the Terms of Cooperation with Your Audience’.
I come to this section of The Legal Imagination with some frustration. For
decades now, interpretive theorists have hectored judges to look only at
109
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the ‘plain meaning’ or ‘original meaning’ of constitutions and statutes, on the
ground that this interpretive method is the only one designed to keep judges
in their proper place. For an interpreter to stray from textualist methodology
in order to consider ‘morality’ or ‘justice’ is, according to the method’s most
vociferous proponents, for a judge to act ultra vires or even to self-deal, as
though allowing ideals of fairness to intrude on one’s interpretation of legislation or constitution were just as nefarious as taking a bribe or committing
treason.112
But certain passages in White’s chapter on statutes reminded me that textualist and originalist interpretive theory often ignores that judges and legislators are partners in a relationship: ‘the one who organizes experience in
language makes a claim for social as well as intellectual creation’.113 White
calls on us to think about the relationship between the statute-maker and
the statute-applier and its ‘degree of trust’.114 As a statute-drafter, ‘what
terms of cooperation will you seek to establish with your judges and
lawyers, and how will you do so?’ (198)115 In a helpful analogy, he says:
Perhaps it would help you get a sense of what I mean by ‘managing the terms of
cooperation’ to draw an analogy to the relationship between cookbook and
cook: the greatest cookbook in the world is no guarantee of a good dinner,
and doubtless some recipes are so bad that even a ﬁne cook cannot save the
meal. The success of the dinner, with which they are both concerned,
depends on the existence of some comprehensible process of cooperation
between them.116.

But that ‘comprehensible process of cooperation’ cannot be reduced to a rule
requiring ‘plain language’ or ‘original meaning’ interpretation, as White,
drawing on Wittgenstein, gently leads the reader to see. In a series of cases
and statutes involving wills, White probes the problem often posed by a
devise to a ‘survivor’ in cases of simultaneous death, pointing out that the
‘plain language’, or a narrow statement of ‘the issue’ in the case as a simple
factual uncertainty about who survived whom, is rarely ‘what is really at
issue’ in the sense of fair or desired distribution of assets upon death.
Instead of focusing ‘the issue’ on the meaning of a particular statutory term,
White suggests ‘that we conceive of a statute as a way of setting up conversations among its users, as a way of giving structure to an activity of statement,
question, response, and argument among people of the law’.117 To think of a
statute this way, one must ﬁrst, says White, ‘have a good idea who the
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participants are’.118 He notes that ‘the special relationship between the legislator and his audience permits a great deal to be left unsaid’.119 And the
drafter of the statute should be thinking about ‘what sort of conversations
among lawyers and judges do you want to give rise to? What questions
do you want these people to ask, what concerns do you want them to
have? What have you done to ensure that what you want to happen will
happen?’120
As I mused on these passages, I thought of how less-narrowly conceived
forms of statutory or constitutional interpretation, that do consider fairness
and justice in interpreting both legislation and constitutions, are governed
by White’s questions.

Who are the participants in this conversation? What is their
relationship? What is left unsaid or assumed by the relationship?
If Miss Manners were to write a guide to statutory interpretation, she might
start just here, accepting (graciously) White’s invitation to consider the
proper forms of polite engagement that govern relations between legislators
and judges. (She might also accept White’s invitation to expand the metaphors in which we think of law, moving from sporting images of balls and
strikes, to images of etiquette and cooking.) In imagining what Miss
Manners might make of the polite traditions of judges as they interpret and
apply the work of legislators, many of which ‘go without saying’,121 I put
forward a few ‘propositions:
Assume good intentions
Miss Manners always assumes others are operating with the best of intentions.
To do so is to treat them with respect, to make the best of a diﬃcult situation,
and to model, always, proper conduct. Judges should do, and usually do, the
same. This rule of charitable interpretation is apparent in several oldfashioned doctrines of statutory and constitutional interpretation. For
example, if Congress writes a criminal statute that includes no mens rea
element, the Court will often supply one, because the Court will assume
that Congress did not intend to allow innocent persons to be convicted.122
If Congress writes a statute that might be construed to violate a constitutional
right, the Court will do its best to ‘avoid’ the constitutional issue, by adopting a
118
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construction of the statute that is plainly within constitutional bounds.123 If a
procedural alteration can correct a constitutional error while still supporting
the apparent purposes of the legislation, the Court will adopt a saving construction of an unconstitutional statute rather than strike it down.124 And
even if Congress writes a statute, or if the President issues an executive
order, that is sound on its face, but is intended as a subterfuge to violate a
right, the Court will often uphold it nonetheless, except in circumstances
where the very intent of Congress or a state legislature creates a stigmatic
harm, or upon further proof that the statute is being applied in an unfair
way. For example, in Trump v. Hawaii, the Court set to one side President
Trump’s anti-Muslim tweets and comments in upholding an executive order
decreeing a temporary ban on travel to the United States from several
countries. The Court explained:
‘Plaintiﬀs argue that this President’s words strike at fundamental standards of
respect and tolerance, in violation of our constitutional tradition. But the issue
before us is not whether to denounce the statements. It is instead the signiﬁcance of those statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its
face, addressing a matter within the core of executive responsibility. In doing
so, we must consider not only the statements of a particular President, but
also the authority of the Presidency itself’. ‘We … will uphold the policy so
long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justiﬁcation independent of unconstitutional grounds’.125

The Court’s ‘politeness’ at times borders on wilful blindness, yet were the
Court to presume coequal branches were acting badly, without evidence of
unfair results, respect would soon be gone. Miss Manners might say that it
is only by being respectful of even the disrespectful that respect becomes
deeply embedded in a constitutional and social tradition.
Originalists and textualists are often provoked to dissent in such cases; after
all, the Court is not reading the text ‘accurately’.126 Yet by assuming
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Congress’s good intentions, the Court is demonstrating respect for a coordinate branch of government in a way that Miss Manners, and I suspect Professor White, would approve.
One important corollary of this respect for other branches is that the judiciary must, in interpreting the intentions of coordinate branches, be able to
say what is good about good intentions. Not punishing the innocent, for
example, is a principle of justice that the Court is attending to when it
‘reads in’ mens rea requirements. Providing people with a chance to be
heard is a principle of justice that the Court is attending to when it ‘reads
in’ procedural prerequisites. One cannot show respect to others without
implicitly following standards of justice (or manners) that ‘go without
saying’ and also, therefore, go beyond the text.
Don’t be a scold; don’t be a wise guy
Miss Manners never scolds. Miss Manners seeks to correct others’ behaviour
by example only, never by harangue, or by snide comments. Miss Manners
will also quietly ignore small errors and interpret another’s inarticulate
comment charitably, and would never, for example, point out to someone
who greeted her with a kind ‘Good Morning’ that it was, in fact, afternoon.
Likewise, judges should refrain from lecturing Congress about its grammar,
or sending legislation back to Congress with red marks for revision. Traditional
forms of judicial interpretation always interpret statutes in light of their apparent purpose and in the context of other law, disregarding clearly ‘absurd’ readings that would cause the legislation to fail, even if such readings would be
‘plain’.127 Judges should not, Miss Manners would say, employ plain language
to mischievously misapply statutes in an Amelia Bedelia fashion.
Again, such decisions often provoke textualists and originalists to complain
that the judiciary is legislating, ﬁxing and amending statutes instead of merely
applying them. They argue that the Court must read the language as written,
even if it means that Congress has to go back to the drawing board and get its
grammar right, this time.128 This view hardly supports democratically-enacted
legislation, but instead reﬂects hypercritical legal pedantry. Miss Manners
would not approve. No one likes a wise guy.
no way in which any of these cases, or all of them in combination, can be read to stand for the sweeping
proposition that ‘the presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply … ’ even when the
plain text of the statute says otherwise’.)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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King v Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2492–93 (2015)(‘A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is
often clariﬁed by the remainder of the statutory scheme … because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive eﬀect that is compatible with the rest of the law’. [citation omitted] Here,
the statutory scheme compels us to reject petitioner’s interpretation because it would destabilize the
individual insurance market in any State with a Federal Exchange, and likely create the very ‘death
spirals’ that Congress designed the Act to avoid’.)
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See King v Burwell, at 2504 (‘This Court, however, has no free-ﬂoating power “to rescue Congress from
its drafting errors”’. [citation omitted]) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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What conversations does the statute or Constitution encourage us to
have?
Equally important, and rarely considered by either text-only or originalist
interpreters, is White’s second question: what sort of conversation does the
statute or Constitution encourage us to have? White uses the case of Tovey
v. Geiser129 to illustrate how conversations can be poorly directed and focus
on the ‘wrong’ issue. After the tragic death of the Prestons by asphyxiation,
the husband’s devisee and the wife’s heirs litigated about which grisly
details of the death scene were more likely to indicate that one potential benefactor survived the other. The ‘conversation’ structured by the court had
nothing to do with the intentions or expectations of the Prestons, the fairness
to living relatives, the eﬀect of a will executed before the Prestons were
married, and above all allowed no respect for the dead. The Prestons
became, in the court’s discussion, only bodies, with lung capacity, syphilis,
and limbs arranged just so. Only the jury, whose verdict eﬀectively divided
the inheritance between the warring branches of the family, seemed wise.
White, aware as always of his own relationship to his own reader, does not
rant or lecture the reader about the case (as I have just done), but invites
the reader to imagine and engage in a diﬀerently-directed conversation. He
asks ‘could you draft a statute for this case that would increase the chances
of a proper statement of the issue?’130
White’s example led me to think of another, from my own experience. I was
serving as a law clerk when the federal sentencing guidelines ﬁrst came to be
implemented in federal district courts in California. I had spent half of my
clerkship year watching traditional sentencing hearings, in which the conversation was often primarily between the defendant and the judge. The judge
would remind the defendant of the seriousness of the crime, the harm to
the victim, and the damage to others. The defendant would have the opportunity to apologize directly and to speak about his eﬀorts and intentions to
reform. The proceedings were profoundly human, personal, and emotional.
Letters from community members were read by defence counsel; victim
impact statements were read by prosecutors. The attention and course of discussion was ﬁxed on culpability, harm, remorse, restitution, and reform.
Just after the federal guidelines were instituted, these sentencing hearings
changed dramatically. The defendants said nothing. The main purpose of the
hearing became to settle questions of statutory interpretation – whether a
state conviction for assault in the third degree would be considered to add
one or two points to the criminal history score; whether a gun was ‘brandished’ or merely ‘held’, whether sales of two diﬀerent drugs would be considered separate crimes with consecutive sentences, or only one crime. And
129
130

150 Kan. 149 (1939).
White (n 2) 206.

46

E. MERTZ ET AL.

so on. The ‘conversation’ had shifted from culpability, apology and atonement, to cryptic deﬁnitional disputes; from a focus on the defendant, to a
focus on the lawyers and the statutory terminology. Never were the statutory
purposes of sentencing invoked or discussed, the discussion became technical, dry, and incomprehensible to most people in court.
In observing more recent sentencing hearings, my impression is that, as the
federal sentencing guidelines have become both more familiar and no longer
mandatory, previously ‘excluded’ conversations about remorse and reform
are, in many courtrooms, readmitted as relevant. In part this change is the
result of the United States v. Booker131 decision, which requires the sentencing
court to consider, in each case, not only the technical points of the guidelines,
but whether the sentence they give also reﬂects the statutory purposes of
sentencing – proportionality between crime and sentence, rehabilitation,
community safety, etc. The statutory details still direct part of the conversation, and in important ways that direction ensures attention to considerations
of fairness across federal cases, but now these points can be addressed
without foreclosing the core, individualized, and more human conversations
about reconciliation, restitution, and rehabilitation that are supposed to be
at the heart of sentencing.
What can will contests and sentencing hearings teach us about constitutional interpretation? Judges need to ask what kind of conversations the
Constitution invites us to have. In interpreting the Constitution, we should
always have the grand mission of the preambles and Declaration and structured balance of power before us. The framers were not just trying to set
up a system of rules, but a system of good government, and they believed
that government should conform to important moral ideals like liberty, equality, anti-corruption, balanced power, and procedural fairness. The idea that we
should or even could interpret the Constitution without opening our conversations to allow these principles to be debated and discussed is the real
betrayal of our relationship with the founding generation, not some failure
to discern the original meaning of particular words (too often yanked from
their context and cranked through an eighteenth-century dictionary in a
retranslation exercise worthy of Google Translate). Courts interpreting the
Constitution have from the beginning considered the eﬀect of their interpretation on the balance of power among the branches and levels of government,
as well as the durability and workability of the constitutional design.132 They
have given scope to constitutional rights in light of deep-seated ideals of
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fairness and right.133 They interpret the Constitution in light of the goals of
constitution-making and in light of the respect for human dignity, equality,
and liberty that animated the project, assuming, as Miss Manners suggests,
that the Framers had the best of intentions, even though we know they sometimes did not (ahem … slavery … ahem).
In like fashion, statutory interpretation should be guided not just by assigning meanings to words, but by imagining the larger conversation about justice
that the statute is inviting us to have. What evils does it ward oﬀ? What good
was its object? What competing goods does the statute negotiate?
White’s teaching has always been centrally about not losing our humanity
when we become lawyers. The Legal Imagination guides its own readers,
gently. It questions, suggests, exposes, rather than lecturing, proving, and
arguing. In doing so, it assumes the best intentions of its readers. It shows
(as well as telling) its full respect for readers’ intelligence and freedom,
encouraging them to pay close attention to see for themselves how ways
of speaking and writing law can dehumanize (‘defendants’, ‘decedents’),
degrade (‘inmates’, ‘slaves’), distance (‘euthanize’, ‘procedure’), denature
(‘cohabitate’), evade (‘constructive notice’) and derail (‘pleading formalities’)
important human conversations about justice. (590ﬀ) It does this by reminding us of the power and richness of language and inviting us to practice
writing and speaking thoughtfully, so the language of the law does not
crush the human spirit, but channels and ampliﬁes it. And White calls us as
lawyers to say the law in language that shows law’s power to respect
others, and to direct legal conversations to matters that matter. In legal
interpretation, he asks us to be polite, charitable interpreters, who treat legislators and constitution-writers as reasonable (even if they aren’t) and just
(insofar as possible). That requirement of charitable interpretation necessarily
requires judges to address questions of justice, not merely syntax.

Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the author.

In District of Columbia v Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), for example, the ‘right to bear arms’ in a state militia
is read broadly as a right of self-defence; in Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Pierce v
Society of Sisters, 268 US. 510 (1925), prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures and on
the quartering of soldiers in private homes were read to indicate constitutional concern for individual
and family liberty, autonomy, and privacy; in Loving v Virgina, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and Obergefell v Hodges,
135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015), the Court drew on constitutional ideals of equal protection and liberty to ban
restrictions on marriage.
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